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PANDEMIC GOVERNANCE 
 
Yanbai Andrea Wang & Justin Weinstein-Tull 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic created an unprecedented need for 
governance by a multiplicity of authorities. The nature of the pandemic—
globally communicable, uncontrolled, and initially mysterious—required a 
coordinated response to a common problem. But the pandemic was 
superimposed atop our decentralized domestic and international governance 
structures, and the result was devastating: the United States has a death rate 
that is eighteenth highest in the world, and the pandemic has had 
dramatically unequal impacts across the country. COVID-19’s effects have 
been particularly destructive for communities of color, women, and 
intersectional populations. 
This Article finds order in the chaos of the pandemic response by distilling 
a typology for the predominant intergovernmental relationships that 
emerged. Two of these behaviors describe intergovernmental conflict. 
Governments undermined each other by destabilizing and criticizing each 
other’s actions. They did so at all levels: up (when local governments 
undermined states), down (when the federal government undermined states), 
and across (when the federal government undermined itself). Governments 
abdicated responsibility when they failed to act. Two additional behaviors 
describe intergovernmental coordination. Governments collaborated when they 
actively worked together, both vertically and horizontally, to harmonize their 
policies. And they engaged in bandwagoning when they avoided taking initiative 
in making pandemic policy, opting instead to follow the leads of others.  
We argue that these behaviors were the predictable result of well-worn 
structural and political dynamics. Structurally, pandemic policy lies 
uncomfortably on two poles of the federal-state division of responsibilities. 
Ambiguous hierarchies and overlapping roles pushed governments toward 
conflict rather than coordination. Politically, intense partisanship 
transformed nearly every governance decision into symbolic, two-sided 
national battles. These battles provided a default set of relationships that 
became organizing principles for the pandemic response. We use these 
insights to sketch the contours of a way forward. To address the role confusion 
that arose from our multi-sovereigned system of governance, we propose a 
federal pandemic statute that emphasizes and balances role clarity, state 
independence, and explicit governmental action that disrupts inequality. To 
lessen the pull of partisanship, we advocate for the creation of decentralized 
but inclusive subject-matter networks among international, federal, state, and 
local authorities.   
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he nature of the COVID-19 pandemic—globally communicable, 
uncontrolled, and initially mysterious—gave rise to an 
unprecedented need for swift and coordinated action by a multiplicity 
of authorities.1 But the pandemic was superimposed atop our domestic and 
international governmental structures, which are highly decentralized.2 As a 
result, the governmental voices that emerged were largely uncoordinated and 
often combative, and the results were devastating. The United States has a 
death rate that is eighteenth highest in the world.3 The virus’s spread has had 
vastly unequal impacts across the country, with incidence reaching ten times 
as high in some states as in others by July 2020.4 The pandemic has also had 
 
1 See, e.g., ARJEN BOIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC 
LEADERSHIP UNDER PRESSURE 12 (2006) (describing how coordination is necessary to avoid 
conflicts, unnecessary overlap, and to prevent miscommunication); World Health 
Organization [WHO], A World At Risk: Annual report on global preparedness for health emergencies 8  
(Sept. 2019) (noting that “[h]eads of government must appoint a national high-level 
coordinator with authority and political accountability to lead whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society approaches”); World Health Organization [WHO], Coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) Strategy and Planning (July 20, 2020) (emphasizing the importance of 
“[c]oordinat[ing] cross regions”), https://www.who.int/images/default-source/health-
topics/coronavirus/covid-19-exr-srp-infographic-4bdabd6db24449e192eb-
3fdbfe7ada63.png?sfvrsn=f2c0e77b_4.  
2 Responsibilities are decentralized from the federal government down to states, which 
in turn send many of those responsibilities down to their local governments. See generally Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (2017) (describing the 
many policy areas where the federal government has delegated responsibilities to states and 
noting that once states delegate those responsibilities downward to local governments, they 
“do not monitor local compliance with those laws”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–
The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (describing how states 
have “conferred significant political, economic and regulatory authority on many localities.”); 
Richard Briffault, ‘‘What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1318 (1994) (noting that state-local delegations of 
authority are “often quite broad and [ ] rarely revoked. In most states, local governments 
operate in major policy areas without significant external legislative, administrative, or 
judicial supervision”). 
3 See CDC COVID Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#global-
counts-rates. 
4 David M. Studdert, Mark A. Hall & Michelle M. Mello, Partitioning the Curve — Interstate 
Travel Restrictions During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 383 N. ENGL. J. MED. e83 (2020). 
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particularly destructive effects on women,5 communities of color,6 and 
intersectional populations.7 
Governance—defined as the collective management of common 
problems by a multiplicity of often overlapping authorities that together 
constitute a system of rule8—looked like chaos during the early pandemic. It 
was states waiting for guidance from the federal government, but never 
receiving it.9 It was the World Health Organization dictating recommended 
public health measures under international law, and signatory countries 
 
5 Women have experienced greater unemployment as a result of the pandemic than 
men. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Recession With a Difference: Women Face Special Burden, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/business/economy/women-jobs-
economy-recession.html. 
6 See Richard A. Oppel Jr., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/-coronavirus-
latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html (“Black and Latino people have been 
disproportionately affected by the coronavirus in a widespread manner that spans the 
country, throughout hundreds of counties in urban, suburban and rural areas, and across all 
age groups.”). African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have become infected with 
COVID-19 at far higher rates than Whites. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity (Nov. 30, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-
discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html. Once infected, rates of both 
hospitalization and death within these communities also far exceed those of Whites. See id. 
7 The pandemic subjected African American women and Latinas not just to the 
diminished health outcomes associated with communities of color, but also the economic 
pressures the pandemic imposed on women. See, e.g., Bethany Garner, Why Black Women In 
The US Are Being Hit Hardest By Coronavirus, BUSINESS BECAUSE (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.businessbecause.com/news/insights/7138/black-women-in-us-hit-hardest-
by-coronavirus (“The impact of coronavirus on Black women in America has been especially 
bleak.”); Economic Policy Institute, Elise Gould, Daniel Perez & Valerie Wilson, Latinx 
workers—particularly women—face devastating job losses in the COVID-19 recession, Aug. 20, 2020, 
https://www.epi.org/publication/latinx-workers-covid/; Pew Research Center, Rakesh 
Kochhar, Hispanic women, immigrants, young adults, those with less education hit hardest by COVID-19 
job losses, PEW RESEARCH CENTER  (June 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/06/09/hispanic-women-immigrants-young-adults-those-with-less-education-
hit-hardest-by-covid-19-job-losses/. 
8 See, e.g., James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in 
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 4 
(James N. Rosenau and E. O. Czempiel eds. 1992) (explaining that governance “is a more 
encompassing phenomenon than government” because it denotes a system of rule by a range 
of actors and mechanisms exercising authority). 
9 See, e.g., Anne Flaherty et al., After delay, CDC releases new guidance on how states can safely 
reopen, ABC NEWS (May 14, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/delay-cdc-releases-
guidance-states-safely-reopen/story?id=70687074 (noting that the guidelines were issued 
“after most states already ha[d] started to reopen”). 
















diverging.10 It was local governments unsure of their authority, but acting 
anyway.11 It was the Trump administration providing contradictory 
statements on the role of states in addressing the pandemic, sometimes in the 
span of mere days.12 
This Article finds order in that chaos. First, we demonstrate that existing 
public health policies lacked a clear blueprint for intergovernmental 
coordination, creating a void that governments had to fill as the pandemic 
unfolded. To effectively respond to a pandemic crisis, political leaders must 
identify the crisis, make sense of it, and clearly communicate and coordinate 
their response.13 By contrast, pandemic policies at federal, state, and local 
levels lack effective coordination mechanisms. Thousands of state and local 
public health authorities hold broad but dispersed power to respond to 
outbreaks through quarantines, stay-at-home orders, and business 
restrictions.14 Federal public health authorities play a largely supporting role 
 
10 See, e.g., Selam Gebrekidan, The World Has a Plan to Fight Coronavirus. Most Countries Are 
Not Using It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/coronavirus-world-health-
organization.html (noting that despite pandemic guidance and recommendations from the 
World Health Organization, “dozens of countries are flouting the international regulations 
and snubbing their obligations. Some have failed to report outbreaks to the organization, as 
required. Others have instituted international travel restrictions, against the advice of the 
W.H.O., and without notifying global health officials.”). 
11 See, e.g., Victoria Colliver, Small California county prepares to defy Newsom by 
opening bars, churches, POLITICO (Apr 30, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/30/small-california-county-
prepares-to-defy-newsom-by-opening-bars-churches-1281627 (describing how a small 
county in California decided to reopen before the state sanctioned it). 
12 During the first re-open phase of the pandemic in April, 2020, for example, Trump 
claimed “total authority” to re-open down the country only to ultimately announce that he 
would leave it to the governors. Compare Jeremy B. White, Trump Claims ‘Total authority’ over 
State Decisions, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/13/trump-claims-total-
authority-over-state-decisions-1275506 (“‘When somebody’s president of the United States, 
the authority is total,’ Trump said at a press briefing Monday when asked about the 
governors’ plans. ‘And that’s the way it’s got to be. It's total. It’s total. And the governors 
know that.’”) with Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, Trump Says States Can Start Reopening 
While Acknowledging the Decision Is Theirs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-guidelines.html 
(“President Trump told the nation’s governors on Thursday that they could begin reopening 
businesses, restaurants and other elements of daily life by May 1 or earlier if they wanted to, 
but abandoned his threat to use what he had claimed was his absolute authority to impose 
his will on them.”). 
13 See infra Section I.A. 
14 See infra Section I.B.1. 

















by providing resources and technical guidance.15 And although international 
law provides relatively coherent coordination mechanisms between countries, 
it does not clarify pandemic policy within countries.16 
Second, we chronicle the governance that filled this policy void by 
distilling a typology of intergovernmental behaviors that emerged during the 
pandemic. Two of these behaviors describe intergovernmental conflict. 
Governments undermined each other by destabilizing and criticizing each 
other’s actions. They did so at all levels: up (when local governments 
undermined states), down (when the federal government undermined states), 
and across (when the federal government undermined itself).17 Governments 
abdicated responsibility when they failed to act. At times, lower-level 
governments filled those gaps.18 Two additional behaviors describe 
intergovernmental coordination. Governments collaborated when they actively 
worked together, both vertically and horizontally, to harmonize their 
policies.19 And they engaged in bandwagoning when they avoided taking 
initiative in making pandemic policy, opting instead to follow the leads of 
others.20 
Finally, we explain how these behaviors were the predictable result of 
well-worn structural and political dynamics. Structurally, pandemic policy 
lies uncomfortably on two poles of the federal-state division of responsibilities. 
Whereas public health is traditionally a local responsibility, states and local 
governments were ill-equipped to respond to this international problem. 
Ambiguous hierarchies and overlapping roles pushed governments toward 
conflict rather than coordination.21 Politically, intense polarization during an 
election year transformed nearly every governance decision, even those that 
should have been clear from the science, into symbolic, two-sided national 
battles. These battles provided a fallback set of governance relationships and 
policy positions that became organizing principles for the pandemic 
response.22 
We use the insights that flow from our analyses to sketch the contours of 
a way forward. To address the role confusion that arose from our multi-
 
15 See infra Section I.B.2. 
16 See infra Section I.B.3. 
17 See infra Section II.A.1. 
18 See infra Section II.A.2. 
19 See infra Section II.B.1. 
20 See infra Section II.B.2. 
21 See infra Section III.A.1. 
22 See infra Section III.B.1. 















sovereigned system of governance, we propose a federal pandemic statute 
pursuant to Congress’s Spending Power that places particular emphasis on 
role clarity and explicit governmental action that disrupts inequality. To 
preserve the values of federalism and state independence, we propose that 
states be able to negotiate their role in the pandemic response with the federal 
government ahead of time.23 To lessen the pull of politics and provide 
counterweights to existing partisan networks, we advocate for the creation of 
decentralized but inclusive subject-matter networks among international, 
federal, state, and local authorities.24 
To craft these arguments and conclusions, we gathered all pandemic-
related governance decisions in select jurisdictions beginning with the first 
actions in January 2020 and extending through mid-July 2020.25 We 
examined decisions made by federal and international authorities, as well as 
by eight states and select local governments within each state.26 We selected 
the individual states to span three axes: Democratic/Republican (as 
measured by FiveThirtyEight’s “partisan lean” index27), urban/rural (as 
measured by the percentage of state residents living in urban areas28), and 
rich/poor (as measured by state gross domestic product per capita29). We did 
not limit our analysis to actions taken in those jurisdictions, but we used them 
as our starting points. 
Although legal scholars have produced an avalanche of COVID-19 
research, scholarship on governance in the time of the pandemic is sparse and 
 
23 See infra Section III.A.2. 
24 See infra Section III.B.2. 
25 As these dates indicate, our data came primarily from early pandemic governance. But 
as we discuss later, the framework that we propose also describes later pandemic governance, 
even after President Trump left office. 
26 Those states are Arizona, California, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Texas, 
Vermont, and Washington state. We additionally collected governance data from three to 
five local governments within each state. 
27 See Nathaniel Rakich, The States Where Trump Is More (And Less) Popular Than 
He ‘Should’ Be , FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 16, 2019), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-states-where-trump-is-more-and-less-popular-
than-he-should-be/ (“FiveThirtyEight’s partisan lean metric is the average difference 
between how a state votes and how the country votes \overall, with 2016 presidential election 
results weighted at 50 percent, 2012 presidential election results weighted at 25 percent and 
results from elections for the state legislature weighted at 25 percent.”) 
28 Urban Percentage of the Population for States, Historical, U.S. census data from 2010, 
https://www.icip.iastate.edu/tables/population/urban-pct-states. 
29 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Data, GDP and Personal Income,  
https://apps.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1. 
















piecemeal.30 The scholarship that exists uses specific examples of governance 
as support for related topics, like the nature of state-federal relationship31 or 
the extent of federal authority to intervene.32 This Article, by contrast, takes 
governance as its primary concern, allowing it to both more deeply probe the 
layered set of intergovernmental interactions that arose and more 
comprehensively describe the governance spectrum—including at the local, 
state, federal, and international levels.33 This more targeted approach is 
 
30 But see Cary Coglianese & Neysun A. Mahboubi, Administrative Law in a Time of Crisis: 
Comparing National Responses to COVID-19, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2021) (introducing a 
collection of essays comparing the regulatory responses to COVID-19 in key countries, as 
well as the operation of the World Health Organization). 
31 See Nicole Huberfeld, Sarah Gordon & David K. Jones, Federalism Complicates the 
Response to the COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, J. HEALTH POL’Y, POL., 
& L. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3698878 
(describing the ways that federalism has engendered unequal responses to the pandemic by 
states); Lindsay F. Wiley, Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, in ASSESSING LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19 65 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020) (briefly describing how federal-
state conflict has stymied the pandemic response); Nancy J. Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic 
and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3599239 (describing the role of 
federalism during the early days of the pandemic); Emily Berman, The Roles of the State and 
Federal Governments in A Pandemic, 11 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 61 (2020) (describing the 
various roles for the federal and state governments during a pandemic); see also Alejandro E. 
Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Structured to Fail: Lessons from The Trump Administration’s 
Faulty Pandemic Planning and Response, 10 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2021) 
(examining the allocation of authority among federal officials during the pandemic under the 
Trump Administration); James Hodge, National Legal Paradigms for Public Health Emergency 
Responses, 71 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
32 See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the 
Pandemic, available at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608974 
(describing the comparative scope of emergency powers exercised by governments around 
the world); Stephanie Cooper Blum, Federalism: Fault or Feature-an Analysis of Whether the United 
States Should Implement A Federal Pandemic Statute, 60 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2020) (describing the 
extent of federal and state authority to combat a pandemic and advocating a federal 
pandemic statute). 
33 Examining governance at all four of these levels is particularly important given the 
global nature of COVID-19. Looking solely at the state and federal responses is inadequate. 
Pandemics are global problems and so long as borders remain open, even a perfect domestic 
response will be insufficient. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, I. Glenn Cohen & Jeffrey P. 
Koplan, Universal Masking in the United States: The Role of Mandates, Health Education, CDC, J. AM. 
MED. ASS. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2769440 
(noting the spillover effects of health emergencies). Additionally, local governments are often 
neglected in scholarship but have provided much of the relevant governance during the 
pandemic. See, e.g., Dana Bash & Bridget Nolan, Four mayors reflect on their evolving response to the 
coronavirus pandemic, CNN (July 25, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/25/politics/mayors-coronavirus-response/index.html 
(“Since the pandemic began, mayors have been at the front lines of the battle to contain the 
















crucial for reform efforts, as any reform that overlooks or decenters 
intergovernmental relationships will result in policy that fails to move beyond 
the scattershot response that we see now. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the governance needs 
created by the pandemic and the ways that our governance capabilities fell 
short at all levels. Part II provides a framework that describes and 
characterizes the intergovernmental behaviors that arose in the absence of 
preexisting pandemic guidance. Part III offers structural and political 
explanations for these intergovernmental behaviors, and proposes reforms 
that mitigate the potential for intergovernmental conflict and passivity, 
thereby increasing the chances of effective pandemic management. The 
Conclusion describes how our framework and insights can apply beyond the 
context of the early COVID-19 pandemic, potentially to other crises 
requiring robust and coordinated governmental response. 
 
I. PANDEMIC THEORY AND POLICY 
 
here is both a robust academic literature on pandemics and crisis 
management, as well as a host of international, federal, state, and 
local policies already in place that seek to respond to pandemics and 
related public health problems. Examining the theory and policy of 
pandemics together—as we do in this Part—reveals a gap between the serious 
demands that pandemics place on governments and the pandemic-related 
policies that we possess.  
Crisis management theory tells us that effectively responding to a 
pandemic requires extensive intergovernmental work: governments must 
identify and define the crisis and then clearly communicate and coordinate 
their response. Our existing pandemic policies largely failed to accomplish 
these tasks, opening up space for the more ad hoc governance that we discuss 
in Part II. Nationally, there is no clear blueprint for a concerted response to 
a widespread infectious outbreak. The United States has not experienced a 
pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 for over a century. Infectious disease 
has received little federal policy attention until recent decades, when concerns 
about bioterrorism recast infectious disease in security terms. Internationally, 
the World Health Organization adopted an updated framework for 
addressing infectious disease in 2005—the revised International Health 
Regulations—but that framework provides only a partial path forward due 
to political and financial constraints as well as a lack of clarity on pandemic 
policy within countries. State and local public health authorities hold broad 
 
coronavirus in cities all across the country.”). 
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powers to respond to outbreaks, but largely lack coordination mechanisms. 
The absence of a clear national template for action, key pressure points within 
the international template, and the fact that policies are enacted by 
institutions that themselves reflect existing inequalities, form the backdrop 
against which COVID-19 arose. 
 
A.  Pandemics and Crisis Management Theory 
 
Crises in general, and pandemics in particular, place heavy demands on 
leaders, governments, and policies. A crisis is typically defined as a phase of 
disorder34 marked by elevated levels of threat, urgency, and uncertainty.35 
Crises require actions to be taken on a compressed time scale. And they are 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the nature of the 
threat, its consequences, the search for solutions, and the public’s response to 
the emerging situation. A crisis simultaneously generates an overload of raw 
data and a shortage of clear, accurate information, making it hard to parse 
signal from noise. When a crisis is global in scope, uncertainty may be 
magnified by lengthy and complex chains of causation. This description of 
crisis encompasses a wide range of events, from natural disasters to political 
unrest.36 What these events have in common is that they call on political 
leaders to serve as crisis managers and to solve complex problems with 
incomplete information.  
As crisis managers, political leaders are faced with varied tasks during the 
lifecycle of a crisis. First, they must determine that a crisis is occurring and 
make sense of it.37 Identifying an event as a crisis is critical to raising public 
awareness, placing the crisis on the political agenda, and facilitating a 
collective response.38 Yet crises are often hard to detect at the outset. Leaders 
must weigh the consequences of waiting for more information against 
committing resources on the basis of the limited or fragmented information 
 
34 See Charles Tilly & Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Roads from Past to Future, in LEGACIES OF 
SOCIAL THOUGHT SERIES (1997). 
35 URIEL ROSENTHAL ET AL., COPING WITH CRISES: THE MANAGEMENT OF 
DISASTERS, RIOTS, AND TERRORISM 10 (1989) (defining crisis as “a serious threat to the 
basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which—under time 
pressure and highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates making critical decisions”). 
36 For more examples, see Eric Stern & Bengt Sundelius, Crisis Management Europe: An 
Integrated Regional Research and Training Program, 3 INT’L STUD. PERSPECTIVES 71 (2003). 
37 ARJEN BOIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC LEADERSHIP 
UNDER PRESSURE 18-41 (2006). 
38 Saundra K. Schneider & Marty P. Jordan, Political Science Research on Cries and Crisis 
Communications, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
RESEARCH 14 (Andreas Schwarz, Matthew W. Seeger & Claudia Auer eds., 2016). 
















available. They must identify what the crisis is, the level of threat it poses, and 
how the situation is likely to evolve over time. And they must make sense of 
the crisis’ meaning and frame it with a compelling story that shapes attitudes 
and behaviors in a productive way.39 
Second, political leaders must mount an effective response based on 
strategies that resonate with how they have framed the crisis.40 Such a 
response requires clear communication and competent coordination. During 
a crisis, the public is in a state of anxiety and has a heightened need for 
transparency and guidance.41 Uncertainty and fear are highest at the outset 
of a crisis, limiting the public’s ability to process information. Early 
communication, therefore, needs to be clear, simple, and frequent,42 relaying 
accurate information—good and bad—quickly.43 The public needs 
straightforward instructions on how to stay safe, and the key elements must 
be repeated.44 One study found that an audience needs to hear a message 
related to health risk nine to twenty-one times to effectively communicate 
risk.45 
Effective crisis management also requires different actors to coordinate 
their efforts. An emergency requires clear lines of authority. Coordination is 
needed to avoid conflicts, unnecessary overlap, and to prevent 
miscommunication.46 When a crisis extends across multiple jurisdictions or 
its scope exceeds the response capacity of local authorities,47 there can be an 
“upward” shift in decision-making as the task of coordinating the response 
 
39 JOHN HANNIGAN, DISASTERS WITHOUT BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
OF NATURAL DISASTERS 82 (2012). 
40 BOIN ET AL., supra note [], at 82. 
41 Ana Mendy, Mary Lass Stewart & Kate VanAkin, A Leader’s Guide: Communicating with 
Teams, Stakeholders, and Communities During COVID-19, in LEADERSHIP IN A CRISIS: 





42 MENDY, STEWART & VANAKIN, supra note [], at 2. 
43 Fran H. Norris et al., Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and 
Strategy for Disaster Readiness, 41 AM. J. CMTY. PSYCH 127, 127–50 (2008). 
44 T. Vihalemm, M. Kiisel & H. Harro‐Loit, Citizens’ Response Patterns to Warning Messages, 
20 J. CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MGMT. 13, 13–25 (2012). 
45 Lu Liu, Xi Lu, & Xiaofei Xie, Inverted U-shaped Model: How Frequent Repetition Affects 
Perceived Risk, 10 JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING No. 3, at 219–24 (2015). 
46 BOIN ET AL., supra note [], at 12. 
47 Id. 
















moves up to regional, national, or international authorities.48  
By nature, infectious disease is not geographically contained and requires 
coordination across all jurisdictions affected. By the time an epidemic 
becomes a pandemic, there is worldwide transmission.49 For this reason, 
infectious disease control is considered a global public good that no single 
government can provide on its own.50 National authorities must work 
together to coordinate reporting and response efforts, and hard international 
law is needed to discourage countries from defecting.51 Guides on public 
health preparedness and response recommend a “whole-of-government” and 
“whole-of-society” approach for combatting public health emergencies, 
typically recommending federal and international leadership, coordination, 
and support,52 with local execution of crisis response.53 
 
B.  Pandemic Policy 
 
These demands of successful pandemic management are at odds with the 
pandemic policies we possess. Because our constitution disperses power 
 
48 Id. at 42; see also id. at 171 (“Crises exert upward pressure on routine decision-making 
structures.”). 
49 What is a Pandemic?, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 24 2010), 
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/en/ 
(“A pandemic is the worldwide spread of a new disease.”). 
50 A global public good is “nondivisible,” meaning that all can benefit from the public 
good once it is produced, and “nonexcludable,” meaning that it is not possible to exclude 
any individual or group from the benefits. Lincoln C. Chen, Tim G. Evans & Richard A. 
Cash, Health as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 284 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern, 
eds., Oxford University Press 1999). 
51 Hard international law—law that is binding, precise, and delegates interpretive and 
enforcement authority to a third party—is useful for making serious commitments. Kenneth 
W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan 
Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).  
52 World Health Organization [WHO], A World at Risk: Annual report on global preparedness 
for health emergencies 8 (Sept. 2019), 
https://apps.who.int/gpmb/assets/annual_report/GPMB_annualreport_2019.pdf ; 
Barishansky, supra note [], at 5, 13; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORK 21 (4th ed. 2019). The National Response Framework sought to create a guide 
for how to best organize federal, state, local, and private response to any type of domestic 
incident, whether or not an emergency has been declared. 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRF_FAQ.pdf. 
53 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 16 (4th ed. 
2019). The National Response Framework sought to create a guide for how to best organize 
federal, state, local, and private response to any type of domestic incident, whether or not an 
emergency has been declared. https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRF_FAQ.pdf. 

















between state and federal authorities,54 pandemic policies—to the extent they 
exist at all—exist at all levels of government. In theory, multi-level pandemic 
policies allow the federal government and international authorities to act on 
questions of national and international importance while permitting states 
and local governments to enact laws more tailored to the needs and 
preferences of their constituents.55 In practice, the existence of policies at 
multiple levels requires tremendous coordination to execute, both vertically 
among governments and horizontally within governments.56  
To control a pandemic, all levels of government must work together at 
surveillance, testing, implementing protective measures, developing drugs 
and vaccines, and maintaining hospital and equipment capacity. But whereas 
relatively clear coordination mechanisms exist at the international level, they 
are lacking at federal, state, and local levels. Across the country, thousands of 
state- and local- level public health authorities hold broad but dispersed 
power to respond to outbreaks through quarantines, stay-at-home orders, and 
business restrictions. Federal public health authorities play a supporting role 
by injecting resources and providing technical guidance. This supporting role 
is shaped by federal statutes of relatively recent vintage that were created to 
address the particular concern of bioterrorism, and do not provide marching 
orders for a nation-wide response to a widespread and protracted outbreak. 
Internationally, the World Health Organization and its predecessor 
organizations have long regulated and coordinated cross-border efforts at 
infectious disease control. Our decentralized system of government, 
nationally and globally, complicates those efforts. 
 
1. Local and State 
 
States and local governments possess a “police power” which includes the 
authority “to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description.’”57 
The power to regulate public health “has long been regarded as one of the 
 
54 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
55 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1484 (1987) (discussing the normative values of federalism and decentralized 
policymaking). 
56 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 394 (2016) (“The vast expansion of emergency preparedness laws has raised 
concerns about coordination among different levels of government, interagency coordination 
within each level of government, and protections for individual rights.”). 
57 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824)). 

















states’ primary and most important ‘police powers.’”58 States have historically 
enacted a host of laws responsive to health emergencies—and outbreaks in 
particular—including forced isolations, quarantines, and detentions.59 More 
recently, states have deployed their powers to respond to the security concerns 
raised by the September 11 attacks. Following 9/11, the CDC commissioned 
the creation of a “Model State Emergency Health Powers Act” (MSEHPA), 
which was designed to provide a statutory framework for states to respond to 
public health emergencies, especially those related to terrorism.60 The 
MSEHPA has been adopted by thirty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia.61 
The MSEHPA and other state laws provide broad powers to governors 
to take action to respond to emergencies.62 Governors are empowered to 
declare emergencies in outbreaks of communicable disease.63 Some states 
specify that state emergencies are partly defined as emergencies so severe that 
they exceed the capacities of local governments to handle.64 During declared 
emergencies, governors consolidate the authority of the state executive 
branch, including its agencies.65 Specific powers vary by state, but as a general 
 
58 Women’s Cmty. Health Ctr. of Beaumont, Inc. v. Texas Health Facilities Comm’n, 
685 F.2d 974, 981 n.11 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Supreme Court cases). For an overview of the 
state police power as it relates to public health, see James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New 
Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 318-30 (1998). 
59 See generally Hodge, supra note [],at 325-30; Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, The Long 
History of Coercive Health Responses in American Law, LAWFARE.COM (Apr. 13, 2020, 2:56 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/long-history-coercive-health-responses-american-law. 
60 GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note [], at 399-400. 
61 Id. at 394. 
62 Some have criticized the MSEHPA for granting unchecked emergency powers that 
may infringe on civil liberties. See, e.g., ACLU, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act.  
63 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-301(15) (defining a “State of emergency” as a 
“condition[] of disaster or of extreme peril” caused by, among other things, “epidemic”); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (same). 
64 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-301(15) (requiring that states of emergency be “likely to be 
beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, 
city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to 
combat”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (same). 
65 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8627 (“During a state of emergency the Governor shall 
. . . have complete authority over all agencies of the state government and the right to exercise 
within the area designated all police power vested in the state by the Constitution and laws 
of the State of California in order to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.”); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 26-303(E) (same); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29 (“Upon the declaration of a state disaster 
emergency the governor may direct any and all agencies of the state government to provide 
assistance under the coordination of the disaster preparedness commission . . . .”); TEX. 
















matter, governors and other state actors may prevent people from gathering 
together,66 administer quarantines, detentions, and disinfection,67 use state 
funding for relief spending,68 commandeer private property for the 
emergency response,69 suspend state laws,70 engage in enhanced surveillance 
techniques,71 and regulate businesses.72 
Some of these state laws encourage coordination with other governmental 
authorities, but only weakly. The MSEHPA, for instance, requires the 
development of a plan “to provide a coordinated appropriate response” to 
public health emergencies.73 Upon the declaration of a public health 
emergency, the MSEHPA requires the state public health authority to 
coordinate response efforts between state and local authorities as well as to 
collaborate with relevant federal government authorities and elected officials 
 
GOV’T CODE § 418.015(c) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 9(1) (same). 
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2253(1) (“If the director determines that control of an 
epidemic is necessary to protect the public health, the director by emergency order may 
prohibit the gathering of people for any purpose and may establish procedures to be followed 
during the epidemic to insure continuation of essential public health services and 
enforcement of health laws.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.018 (empowering the governor to 
regulate the “[m]ovement of [p]eople”). 
67 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.082(f) (empowering state officials to regulate “(1) 
immunization; (2) detention; (3) restriction; (4) disinfection; (5) decontamination; (6) isolation; 
(7) quarantine; (8) disinfestation; (9) chemoprophylaxis; (10) preventive therapy; (11) 
prevention; and (12) education”). 
68 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8566 (“The Governor is empowered to expend any 
appropriation for support of the California Emergency Services Act to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter.”). 
69 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8572 (“In the exercise of the emergency powers hereby 
vested in him during a state of war emergency or state of emergency, the Governor is 
authorized to commandeer or utilize any private property or personnel deemed by him 
necessary in carrying out the responsibilities hereby vested in him as Chief Executive of the 
state and the state shall pay the reasonable value thereof.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
418.017(c) (“The governor may commandeer or use any private property if the governor 
finds it necessary to cope with a disaster, subject to the compensation requirements of this 
chapter.”). 
70 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a(1) (“[T]he governor may by executive order 
temporarily suspend any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or parts 
thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions 
would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster or if necessary to 
assist or aid in coping with such disaster.”). 
71 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-782. 
72 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06.220(2)(g) (authorizing the governor to issue 
“statutory and regulatory obligations or limitations prescribing the procedures for conduct of 
state business”). 
73 MSEHPA Preamble. 















of other states.74 Vermont’s emergency management director, for example, is 
required to “[m]aintain liaison and cooperation with emergency 
management agencies and organizations of the federal government, other 
states, and Canada.”75 However, these state directives lack policy specificity, 
clear lines of authority, and mechanisms for decision-making that would 
enable a coordinated response to a nation-wide pandemic. 
Local governments are also important sources of pandemic policy. Local 
governments are technically creations of the state.76 In practice, however, 
they are often quite independent from their states and exercise significant 
discretion of their own.77 State laws both grant legal authority to local 
government actors to respond to pandemics and constrain local power.78 In 
Arizona, for example, local government leaders may declare local states of 
emergency and exercise a wide range of powers, including ordering curfews 
and closing businesses.79 New York designates its local governments as “the 
first line of defense in times of disaster,” with support from the state,80 and 
empowers local executives to establish curfews, suspend sales, and regulate 
public gatherings.81 State laws constrain these local powers as well. In 
Arizona, local orders may not conflict with state action.82 In Vermont, state 
actors—and not local ones—appoint the members of local emergency 
planning committees.83 
 
74 MSEHPA art. IV, § 403(b). 
75 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3(b)(3); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.407(1) (same). 
76 See Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (local governments are 
“subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them”). 
77 See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1318 (1994) (“In practice, [local governments] function 
as representatives of local constituencies and not as field offices for state bureaucracies.”); 
Weinstein-Tull, supra note [], at 1105 (noting that “[l]ocal governments are quirky hybrids” 
between state creation and independent entity). 
78 Those delegations of authority may track the diversity of state-local relationships more 
broadly. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note [], at 877-83 (describing how the broader relationships 
between states and their local governments inform the state-local balance of power in the 
context of specific policy areas). 
79 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-311. 
80 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20(1)(a). Other states grant similarly broad local powers. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453(1). 
81 Id. § 24. 
82 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-307(A) (“[C]ounties, cities and towns may make, amend and 
rescind orders, rules and regulations necessary for emergency functions but such shall not be 
inconsistent with orders, rules and regulations promulgated by the governor.”). 
83 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 32(a). 

















State and local public health policies mirror and perpetuate existing 
income inequalities. Pandemic policy exists at all levels of domestic 
government, but it is enacted by a myriad of public health systems that vary 
greatly, both between and within states, in capacity and preparedness. The 
degree of inequality in local public health spending approximates household 
income inequality, ranging from less than $1 per capita to $400 per capita.84 
Due to long-term underfunding of public health and emergency preparedness 
systems,85 only five states have over half of their population served by a 
comprehensive public health system.86 More generally, there are significant 
differences in health care access and outcomes across the country, with rural 




Sandwiched between state and local governments on the one hand and 
international organizations on the other, the federal government has used its 
policymaking authority predominantly to play a supportive role in public 
health emergencies. 
The Constitution does not provide pandemic-specific federal powers, but 
it does provide Congress with general Commerce and Spending powers to 
enact pandemic-related policies. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress 
to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”88 Although not as 
broad a power as it once was,89 the Commerce power still permits the federal 
 
84 Public Health Spending and Medicare Resource Use: A Longitudinal Analysis of U.S. Communities, 
SYSTEMSFORACTION.COM (2017), http://systemsforaction.org/projects/public-health-
spending-and-medicare-resource-use-longitudinal-analysis-us-communities. 
85 See LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC 
HEALTH, 316-480 (2000) (describing deep cuts to the American public health infrastructure 
during the second half of the twentieth century). 
86 2018 National Longitudinal Survey of Public Health Systems, SYSTEMS FOR 
ACTION.COM (2018), http://systemsforaction.org/projects/nalsys-resources-and-
results/articles/national-longitudinal-survey-public-health-systems-nalsys-united-states-
1998-2018 (based on following a nationally representative cohort of communities from 1998 
to 2018). 
87 Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services 
Administration Office of Health Equity, Health Equity Report 2017 (2018), 
https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/health-equity/2017-HRSA-health-equity-
report.pdf.  
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
89 See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, and noting 
that although prior Commerce Clause cases had “giv[en] great deference to congressional 
action,” the Court “decline[e] here to proceed any further”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist 
















government to regulate even private action in areas of traditional state 
regulation90 so long as those activities “substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”91 The Spending Clause empowers Congress to “pay the Debts 
and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States,”92 and allows 
Congress, with some limitations, to offer federal funding to states in exchange 
for state action that enacts federal priorities.93 Emergencies, like pandemics, 
do not create additional constitutional powers,94 and though the President may 
take action to respond to emergencies, the Court has generally required those 
actions to find support in existing legislation.95 
Over the past two decades, Congress has used these powers to enact a 
host of pandemic-related laws.96 Most were shaped by the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks and the ensuing anthrax attacks of 2001, when letters 
laced with anthrax appeared in the United States mail targeting news media 
offices and two Democratic Senators.97 Around the same time, Congress 
enacted the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act,98 the Public Health 
 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.1 (2004) (noting Lopez was part of “a change 
in the Court’s direction”). 
90 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming federal marijuana laws as 
a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Power, even as applied to an individual using 
privately grown marijuana for medical purposes within a state with legalized medical 
marijuana). 
91 Id. at 17. 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
93 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576, 580-81 (2012) (noting 
that the Court has “long recognized that Congress may use [its Spending] power to grant 
federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ taking certain 
actions that Congress could not require them to take” but also holding that Congress may 
not coerce states to take action by threatening to withdraw existing federal funding) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
94 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Many think 
it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to security in times of national 
crisis . . . . Whatever the general merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its 
voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed 
precisely to confront war and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to 
accommodate it.”). 
95 See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
96 Because these laws have been ably collected and described elsewhere, what follows is 
just a summary. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note [], at 399-400; James Hodge & Evan 
Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 249, 255-63 (2008). 
97 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation, 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation. 
98 Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-505, 114 Stat. 
















Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act,99 Project 
Bioshield Act,100 the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act,101 
the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act,102 the National Response 
Framework,103 and the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.104 These 
law joined pre-existing public health statutes such as the Robert T. Stafford 
 
2314. This law amended the Public Health Service Act to fund improved federal response 
capabilities, a system for evaluating state readiness, and grant programs for states to improve 
their public health capacity. 
99 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107–188, 116 Stat 594 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh). This law amended the 
Public Health Service Act in response to anthrax concerns to better prepare the federal 
government to respond to a bioterrorism or other public health emergency. 
100 Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–276, 118 Stat 835. This law authorizes 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to research, create, acquire, 
and stockpile countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threats. 
101 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
Div. C, § 2, 119 Stat. 2818. This law provides some immunity from tort liability from the use 
of countermeasures authorized by the HHS Secretary during a public health emergency. 
102 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417. This law 
provided funding for public health and medical preparedness programs, including Project 
BioShield, created the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in the Department 
of Health and Human Services, and established the National Health Security Strategy, a 
response plan to be updated every four years “to prevent, detect, assess, prepare for, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from disasters and emergencies.” Ass’n of State and Territorial 
Health Officials, Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act Fact Sheet (2011), 
https://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-
Law/Emergency-Authority-and-Immunity-Toolkit/Pandemic-and-All-Hazards-
Preparedness-Act-Fact-Sheet/. The current Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response has received some criticism for using funds to stockpiling defense against manmade 
bioterrorism rather than viral pandemics. See Jon Swaine et al., Before pandemic, Trump’s stockpile 
chief put focus on biodefense. An old client benefited., WASH. POST (May 4, 2020, 7:35 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/before-pandemic-trumps-stockpile-chief-
put-focus-on-biodefense-an-old-client-benefited/2020/05/04/d3c2b010-84dd-11ea-878a-
86477a724bdb_story.html. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act was 
reauthorized as The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation 
Act of 2019. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 
2019, Pub. L. No. 116-22, 133 Stat. 905 (2019). 
103 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (4th ed. 2019). 
The National Response Framework sought to create a guide for how to best organize federal, 
state, local, and private response to any type of domestic incident, whether or not an 
emergency has been declared.  
104 U.S. Homeland Sec. Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (2005), 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/planning-preparedness/national-strategy-
planning.html. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was established by the George 
W. Bush administration in 2005 and an implementation plan was published in May 2006 by 
the Department of Homeland Security. Its purpose was to prepare for a response to a 
potential pandemic, with a focus on the avian flu. 














Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,105 the Public Health Service 
Act,106  and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.107 These statutes are 
administered by a number of bureaucratic agencies, including the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention,108 the Food and Drug Administration,109 
and the Homeland Security Council.110 
These statutes enable the federal government to play largely supporting 
roles—like providing financial assistance, technical guidance, and research 
support—in public health emergencies. The Stafford Act, for example, 
authorizes the federal government to assist state and local governments 
during declared disasters or emergencies, but governors typically need to 
initiate the request.111 The Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act, and the Pandemic and All-
 
105 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2012). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). The Public Health Service Act of 1944 gave the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) the responsibility of limiting the spread of 
communicable diseases in the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2012). It gives the HHS 
Secretary broad discretion to declare a public health emergency, which frees up federal funds 
for the executive branch to use, without having to wait for a governor to request it.  
107 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012). This law provides a process through which drugs, 
vaccines, and other countermeasures to pandemics are approved. It also allows for the 
emergency authorization for unapproved countermeasures in some circumstances. See 21 
U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1) (2012). 
108 The Centers for Disease Control is responsible for preventing entry and spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States and between states 
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, 
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html. 
109 The Food and Drug Administration has authority to promote potential treatments 
for diseases. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Emergency Use Authorization, 
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-
policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization. 
110 The Homeland Security Council created the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza Implementation Plan and advises the President on potential threats. Other 
agencies with some responsibility for pandemic response include the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority, the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the General Services Administration, the National 
Security Council, and the Department of State.  
111 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2012). There are two types of declarations under the Stafford Act 
that allows the President to access additional federal funding and other resources. First, a 
“major disaster” declaration is limited to “any natural catastrophe” that overwhelms state 
capabilities and must be initiated by a governor request for federal assistance to which the 
President agrees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5122(2) (2018). It is not clear if a pandemic qualifies as 
a major disaster. Second, an “emergency” declaration can be “any occasion or instance” and 
can be either initiated by a governor request for assistance or unilaterally declared by the 
President where the incident involves primary federal responsibility. 42 U.S.C. § 5170. 
















Hazards Preparedness Act each authorize the provision of funding and 
assistance to states and local governments to assess readiness and improve 
capacity in areas such as surveillance, reporting, laboratory infrastructure, 
and personnel training.112 
By contrast, the federal government engages in limited direct response and 
regulatory activities. These activities are rare in practice and are focused on 
individuals suspected or confirmed to be infected who are arriving from 
foreign countries or moving between states.113 The CDC also provides 
guidelines to states, but these are not legally binding, nor does the CDC have 
personnel on the ground to implement them. 
Many of these federal statutes place federal agencies in a coordinating 
role, but like their state statute counterparts, the coordination envisaged is 
vague. For instance, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
established a National Health Security Strategy that promotes a “whole-of-
government” and “whole-of-nation” response, but does not provide a clear 




Sitting above a thick layer of broad but dispersed local and state authority, 
and a thin layer of federal supportive activity, is a clear framework for 
international cooperation led by the World Health Organization (WHO).  
WHO is the overall “directing and co-ordinating authority on international 
health work.”115 Its functions include providing technical assistance and aid 
during emergencies, establishing epidemiological services, and working 
toward the eradication of epidemic diseases.116 WHO’s policy-making body, 
 
112 Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 106-505, 114 Stat. 2314 
(2000); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 
(2002); Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 
(2006). 
113 The Division of Global Migration and Quarantine within the CDC can apprehend, 
detain, or examine individuals arriving from a foreign country. 42 U.S.C. § 264(c). It can also 
apprehend and examine individuals who are moving between states that it “reasonably 
believes” to be infected, and can detain them if they are confirmed to be infected. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 264(d)(1). 
114 Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistance Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response, Office of Strategy, Policy, Planning, and Requirements, National 
Health Security Strategy: Implementation Plan 2019-2022, 
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/2019-2022-
nhss-ip-v508.pdf.  
115 World Health Organization [WHO], WHO Constitution, art. 2(a) (2006). 
116 WHO Constitution, supra note [], at art. 2(d), (f), (g). 

















the World Health Assembly, has the authority to adopt regulations aimed at 
preventing the international spread of disease.117 Most recently, WHO 
updated an earlier version of international infectious disease law by enacting 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (2005 IHR).118 
The 2005 IHR provides a roadmap for coordinating international 
infectious disease control efforts and has been adopted by 196 state parties, 
including the United States, making it one of the most widely subscribed to 
instruments of international law.119 It vastly expanded WHO’s power to lead 
an international response to outbreaks like COVID-19. It covers “all events 
which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern” 
and aims to rapidly detect and swiftly control epidemics at their source. 
Unlike predecessor regulations that sought to prevent the movement of 
specific diseases across national borders, this approach entails greater 
authority on the part of WHO, deeper obligations on the part of signatory 
countries, and significant overlap between domestic and international 
infectious disease control efforts. 
The 2005 IHR requires state parties to assess public health events within 
their territory and to notify WHO of all events “which may constitute a public 
health emergency of international concern.”120 After the initial notification, 
state parties must continue communicating to WHO “timely, accurate, and 
sufficiently detailed public health information” concerning the event, 
including case definitions, lab results, the number of cases and deaths, as well 
as the difficulties encountered and support needed to respond to the event.121 
State parties must also develop and maintain the domestic public health 
capacity necessary to detect, report, and respond promptly to public health 
emergencies of international concern.122  
On WHO’s part, the organization must carry out its independent 
 
117 Id. at art. 21(a). 
118 World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations, 2509 U.N.T.S. 
79 (May 23, 2005), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessi
onid=20FCAB9DC8D5BE67F27BF53FD2C27C56?sequence=1 [hereinafter 2005 IHR]. 
119 See World Health Organization, Strengthening health security by implementing the International 
Health Regulations (2005): States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/. Adoption of the 2005 IHR is 
voluntary and member states of WHO can opt out. World Health Organization [WHO], 
WHO Constitution, art. 22 (2006). 
120 2005 IHR, supra at note [], at art. 6-7. 
121 Id. at art. 6(a). 
122 Id. at art. 5(1) and 13(1). These capacity building requirements must be met within 
five years of the 2005 IHR entering into force, with the possibility of two two-year extensions. 















surveillance activities by collecting its own information as well as considering 
reports from sources other than the state party where the event is 
occurring.123 Once WHO has received and verified outbreak information 
with the state party where the outbreak is occurring, the organization has the 
authority to disseminate that information, declare a public health emergency 
of international concern, and issue recommendations regarding health 
measures to be implemented.124 It can recommend health measures such as 
restrictions for people, cargo, and conveyances that are intended to prevent 
or reduce the international spread of disease while avoiding unnecessary 
interference with international traffic.125 State parties that implement 
measures beyond those recommended by WHO and that significantly 
interfere with international traffic must provide a public health rationale.126 
When requested, WHO must also assist state parties in reaching their 
capacity building requirements.127 
Although the 2005 IHR was considered a “revolution in the governance 
of global infectious disease,”128 its implementation is complicated by domestic 
and international governance constraints. In adopting the 2005 IHR, the 
United States reserved the right to assume obligations under the agreement 
“in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of federalism.”129 It 
 
123 Id. at art. 5, ¶ 4 and 9, ¶ 1. Previously, WHO had no authority to actively collect 
information regarding disease outbreaks and could not act even if it had become aware of an 
epidemic covered by the predecessor law. 
124 Id. at art. 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18. 
125 Id. at art. 15. 
126 Id. at art. 43(3). 
127 Id. at art. 5(1). 
128 David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of SARS, 113 J. 
CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799, 799 (2004). 
129 2005 IHR, supra at note [], at appendix 2. International law permits countries the 
freedom to determine the domestic mechanisms and structures through which they meet 
their international obligations. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (2d ed., 
Oxford University Press 2005) (States consider that the translation of international 
commands into domestic legal standards is part and parcel of their sovereignty and are 
unwilling to surrender it to international control.”). 
Other federalist countries have utilized innovative strategies for implementing the 
agreement, with Australia, Canada, and India each introducing new federal-level legislation 
to comply with the 2005 IHR. Rebecca Katz & Sarah Komblet, National Models for International 
Health Regulations, Comparative Analysis of National Legislation in Support of the Revised International 
Health Regulations: Potential Models for Implementation in the United States, 100 Am. J. Pub. Health  
2347, 2349-50 (2010); Australian Government, National Health Security Act 2007, No. 174, 
available at https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021C00048 (accessed Feb. 28, 2021); 
Overview of Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, http://www.phn-rsp.ca/index-eng.php 
(last updated Mar. 21, 2016); Kumanan Wilson et al., Strategies for Implementing the New 

















thus agreed to the framework, but subordinated compliance to its 
decentralized form of governance. The 2005 IHR’s implementation has also 
been hampered by insufficient resources to improve national core capacities 
for detection and response, particularly in low-income countries,130 as well as 
the need to further refine centralized coordination mechanisms. Following 
the Ebola outbreak that emerged in West Africa in 2013, global health 
scholars recommended the establishment of a dedicated center for outbreak 
response at WHO with clear lines of accountability and a politically protected 
WHO standing committee for declaring public health emergencies.131 
 
II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL BEHAVIORS 
 
ithout a clear blueprint for a coordinated governance response, a 
dischorus of governmental voices emerged. As Section I.A 
described, the nature of the pandemic required not just 
independent actions from each governmental authority, but coordinated 
governance across them. Federal authorities, who possessed resources and 
expertise, needed to lead a nation-wide response and provide assistance to 
those governments that did not.132 State authorities, who possessed bird’s-eye 
views of their states, had to decide which public health measures to enact on 
a statewide basis and which to delegate to local governments.133 Neighboring 
authorities needed to work together to ensure a consistent set of regulations 
in any given regional area.134 Viewed holistically, however, early pandemic 
 
International Health Regulations, 86 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 215, 215-220 
(2008). 
130 David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The new International Health Regulations: an historic 
development for international law and public health, 34 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 85, 88 (2006) 
(describing the availability of resources for national capacity building as the 2005 IHR’s 
“most pressing question”). 
131 Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic. 
The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386 LANCET 
2204, 2204-21 (2015).  
132 See Carl Hulse, Financial Aid to Struggling States Is Next Big Congressional Battle, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us/politics/congress-state-aid-
coronavirus.html (“Anxious governors on the front lines of battling the pandemic have been 
clamoring for more federal help, saying their budgets are being stretched to the breaking 
point and their revenues are collapsing as they pour resources into health care while their 
economies are shut down.”). 
133 See Sheila R. Foster, The Georgetown Project on State and Local Government Policy 
and Law, As COVID-19 Proliferates Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes in Conflicts with Their 
Governors, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid-19-proliferates-mayors-take-
response-lead-sometimes-in-conflicts-with-their-governors/. 
134 See Adam Rogers, State Alliances Are Leading the US Fight Against Covid-19, WIRED (Apr. 
16, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/state-alliances-are-leading-the-us-fight-
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governance did not correspond with the recommendations of the crisis 
management literature. The multi-sovereigned, decentralized nature of our 
governments resulted in a disarray of policies that operated at times in tension 
and at times in tandem. 
This Part distills patterns of intergovernmental cooperation and conflict 
from the hodge-podge of governmental actions and inactions taken in the 
early months of the pandemic. Focusing on the actions taken by the WHO, 
the federal government, eight contrasting states, and select local governments 
within each state, we identify and categorize these intergovernmental 
behaviors. Emergent pandemic behaviors fell into two categories: those that 
implicated intergovernmental conflict and those that implicated 
intergovernmental coordination. Both types of actions had forms that were 








Passive Abdication Bandwagoning 
 
 
Active conflict is what we call undermining: governments destabilized and 
frustrated each other’s actions in various ways and at all levels. Passive conflict 
consisted of abdication: governments failed to act when necessary and 
abdicated their responsibilities, leaving gaps that were sometimes filled by the 
unilateral—but largely uncoordinated—efforts of lower-level authorities. 
Active coordination consisted of collaboration: governments explicitly worked 
together, both vertically and horizontally, to harmonize their policies as well 
as benefit from each other’s knowledge and mistakes. Finally, passive 
coordination consisted of bandwagoning: governments avoided taking initiative 
in making pandemic policy, opting instead for inaction and then following 
the leads of others. 
 
A.  Conflict 
 
Intergovernmental conflict is built into our system of governance. The 
founders believed this kind of conflict would prevent any single political actor 
 
against-covid-19/ (“[A]s Covid-19 became a bigger and bigger national problem, a back 
channel of public health bureaucrats started working on this problem before the federal 
politicians got to it.”). 

















from becoming too powerful, and thus protect individual freedom against 
governmental overreach.135 Conflict is thus a “feature” of our federal 
system,136 but it also comes with serious costs, especially during a deadly 
pandemic. Because nearly any governmental action during an outbreak 
requires some cooperation with other governments, intergovernmental 
conflict can frustrate the effectiveness of most public policies.137 
 
1. Active: Undermining 
 
One of the most prominent features of early pandemic governance was 
intergovernmental undermining: when one authority took an action or made 
a statement that diminished the effectiveness of another authority’s action. 
Undermining occurred at all levels of government during the response to the 
pandemic. The federal government undermined the WHO, the states, and 
local governments. States undermined their local governments, and local 
governments undermined their states. There has been horizontal 
undermining as well, largely in the form of the federal government 
undermining itself. 
As we describe at greater length in Section III.A below, undermining is a 
tool made available to governments by our system of federalism, which 
provides overlapping responsibilities to multiple layers of government.138 
Some have argued that undermining has the potential to stimulate discourse 
 
135 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides 
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”); Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, The Experience of Structure (manuscript on file with authors) (describing the ways 
that divided powers are meant to increase liberty for individuals); THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, 
180-81 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (“Power being almost always the rival of power, the 
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government.”). 
136 See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014) (noting that “[c]onflict is a recurring feature of . . . 
federalism. . . . State-federal friction has long been understood to be both a problem and a 
valuable part of a well-functioning democracy.”). 
137 See Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, supra note [], at 1086-87. 
138 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 
246 (2005) (“The federal government and the states have extensive areas of concurrent 
authority. In many realms, from narcotics trafficking to securities trading to education, 
federal and state laws regulate the very same conduct.”). Federalism provides each layer with 
its own base of constituents and voters, empowering each to disagree and compete with one 
another. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 40-41 (2010) (describing how government actors at different levels are responsible 
not only to the actors above them, but to the constituents below, and that independent source 
of authority can empower them to resist directives from above). 
















and thus move national policymaking forward.139 Others have argued that it 
can unproductively and opaquely frustrate governmental aims.140 Both of 
these dynamics were at work during the early months of the pandemic. 
Upward undermining allowed lower-level governments (local and state) 
to publicly register disapproval with higher-level governments (state and 
federal) and push for policy change. In Georgia, for example, when the 
Governor sought to aggressively re-open the state, he was met with resistance 
from Keisha Lance Bottoms, the Mayor of Atlanta. “His authority as 
governor is what it is,” Bottoms stated, “and it certainly supersedes my 
authority as mayor on paper, but it doesn’t supersede my voice, and I will 
continue to use my voice to urge our communities, our business owners and 
our residents to stay in.”141  
On the other side of the political aisle, the small county of Modoc, 
California, with no cases of COVID-19, resisted California’s slow re-opening 
plan by re-opening its businesses ahead of California’s schedule.142 Officials 
in that same county, as well as officials in Nevada City, Orange County, 
Sacramento County, Fresno County, Tulare County, and Placer County, 
have refused to enforce California’s mask requirement.143 This upward 
 
139 See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L. J. 1256 (2009). 
140 See generally Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, supra note [] (arguing that 
states and local governments may quietly and sometimes unintentionally undermine federal 
laws in a way that both harms politically disempowered communities and quiets dissent). 
141 James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Reopening debate pits mayors against governors. Atlanta vs. 




142 Victoria Colliver, Small California county prepares to defy Newsom by opening bars, churches, 
POLITICO (Apr 30, 2020, 11:41 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/30/small-california-county-
prepares-to-defy-newsom-by-opening-bars-churches-1281627. 
143 See Leila Miller et al., With no coronavirus cases, a California county defies Gov. Newsom and 
reopens, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 1, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-01/with-no-coronavirus-cases-
california-county-defies-newsom-and-reopen-today; Elita Goyer, Modoc County Sheriff: ‘We 
Will Not Be Enforcing the Face-Mask Order,’ ACTION NEWS NOW (June 25, 2020, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.actionnewsnow.com/content/news/Modoc-Co-Sheriff-We-will-not-be-
enforcing-the-face-mask-order-571382711.html; Alex Wigglesworth, Mayor of Nevada City in 
Northern California lashes out at face coverings rule, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-21/mayor-of-nevada-city-in-northern-
california-lashes-out-at-face-coverings-rule. See also Ryan J. Foley, Defying governor, Iowa City 
mayor mandates masks in public, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 21, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/146dbfdb47167b0b824f5b44ec8f0697 (“Iowa City’s mayor on 















undermining actually resulted in the state of California loosening restrictions 
on some smaller jurisdictions.144 
Downward undermining allowed states to press their local governments 
to come into step with state law. The Nebraska Governor, for example, 
threatened to withhold COVID-19 funding from local governments that 
required people using public services to wear masks.145 The Texas Attorney 
General threatened Austin, San Antonio, and Dallas with lawsuits if they did 
not roll back their mask and shelter-in-place requirements to match the state’s 
more relaxed laws.146 Conversely, the California governor threatened to 
withhold funding to local police departments that refused to enforce the 
state’s mask mandate.147 Although some of these local governments were 
more in line with federal guidelines than their states, undermining 
nevertheless permitted states to assert downward control over their local 
governments. 
Other times, undermining served no useful function and was aimed 
instead at political gaming and distraction. The federal government—and 
President Trump in particular—undermined actors at every level of 
government, including at the federal level, causing confusion and 
 
Tuesday ordered people to wear masks in public to stop the spread of the coronavirus, 
defying Gov. Kim Reynolds’ claim that cities cannot mandate face coverings.”). 
144 See Hannah Fry & Patrick McGreevy, California allows 12 counties to reopen; 31 others lobby 
to join them, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-13/california-allows-12-counties-to-
reopen-31-other-counties-are-lobbying-to-join-them; Alexei Koseff & Erin Allday, Gov. Gavin 
Newsom eases reopening requirements for California counties, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 19, 
2020, 9:42 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Gov-Gavin-Newsom-eases-
reopening-requirements-15278477.php. 
145 See Paul Hammel, Ricketts tells local governments they won't get federal COVID-19 money if they 
require masks, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.omaha.com/news/state_and_regional/ricketts-tells-local-governments-they-
wont-get-federal-covid-19-money-if-they-require-masks/article_d15459b9-26df-527e-9899-
9f579a3d8597.html (“[W]hen it comes to the state’s 93 courthouses and other county offices, 
he doesn’t want local officials to require masks. In fact, he’s told counties that they won’t 
receive any of the $100 million in federal COVID-19 money if their “customers” are required 
to wear masks.”). 
146 See Emma Platoff, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton warns Austin, San Antonio, Dallas to 
loosen coronavirus restrictions, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 12, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/12/texas-attorney-general-warn-cities-
coronavirus/. 
147 Brian Mann, More States Require Masks in Public as COVID-19 Spreads, But Enforcement 
Lags, NPR (July 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/08/888499285/more-
states-requiremasks-in-public-as-covid-19-spreads-but-enforcement-lags 
[https://perma.cc/29ZP-6EXN]. 

















inconsistency. In an attempt to shift blame for the pandemic to the WHO, 
Trump engaged in upward undermining. He falsely accused the WHO of 
failing to investigate reports that conflicted with the Chinese government’s 
accounts and “push[ing] China’s misinformation about the virus.”148 He 
temporarily halted U.S. funding for the WHO, despite concerns from experts 
that doing so would undercut the WHO’s ability to function,149 and 
ultimately withdrew the United States from the WHO altogether.150 
President Trump also engaged in downward undermining of state 
pandemic responses, but unlike the above instances of downward 
undermining, Trump’s undermining was not aimed at securing any kind of 
centralized approach. During the first re-open phase of the pandemic in April 
2020, for example, Trump and his administration undermined the re-open 
schedule that certain states had set. Just a day after stating that he would leave 
the re-open schedule to the governors, Trump issued three tweets meant to 
undermine governors in three states: “LIBERATE MICHIGAN!,”151 
“LIBERATE MINNESOTA!,”152 and “LIBERATE VIRGINIA . . . !”153 
These tweets sought to encourage people in each of these states who were 
protesting the shutdowns put in place by their state governments.154 Rather 
 
148 Glenn Kessler, Trump’s false claim that the WHO said the coronavirus was ‘not communicable,’ 
WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2020, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/17/trumps-false-claim-that-who-said-
coronavirus-was-not-communicable. 
149 Daniel Victor & Christine Hauser, What the W.H.O. Does, and How U.S. Funding Cuts 
Could Affect It, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/health/who-world-health-organization-
coronavirus.html (“President Trump’s decision to halt funding for the World Health 
Organization, depriving it of its biggest funding source, could have far-reaching effects in 
efforts to fight diseases and make health care more widely available across the globe.”). 
150 See Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Trump announces end of US relationship with World 
Health Organization, CNN (May 29, 2020, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-
organization/index.html. 
151 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:22 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1251169217531056130. 
152 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:21 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1251168994066944003. 
153 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:25 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1251169987110330372. 
154 Trump Foments Protests Against Governors; Experts Warn of Testing Shortages, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/us/coronavirus-cases-news-
update.html (“President Trump on Friday openly encouraged right-wing protests of social 
distancing restrictions in states with stay-at-home orders, a day after announcing guidelines 
for how the nation’s governors should carry out an orderly reopening of their communities 
on their own timetables.”). 

















than promote harmony with the CDC’s response guidelines, these tweets 
seemed intended to politically harm three Democratic governors who had 
been critical of Trump. 
In addition to political downward undermining, the federal government 
also engaged in administrative and legal downward undermining. On the 
administrative front, despite President Trump’s admonitions to states that 
they should get their own equipment rather than rely on the federal 
government,155 the federal government actually actively undermined that 
state effort. One report detailed that state leaders in Massachusetts,156 
Kentucky,157 and Colorado158 confirmed orders for personal protective 
equipment only to have the Trump administration take control of those 
shipments and redirect them to the federal government, costing weeks of 
delay.159  
On the legal front, the federal government threatened to sue states that 
did not open quickly enough. In an interview, U.S. Attorney General Bill Barr 
“explained that the Justice Department can try to intimidate governors into 
backing away from policies the Trump administration opposes. ‘If we think 
one goes too far, we initially try to jawbone the governors into rolling them 
back or adjusting them,’ he said. ‘And if they’re not and people bring lawsuits, 
 
155 See Quint Forgery, ‘We’re not a shipping clerk’: Trump Tells Governors to Step up Efforts to Get 
Medical Supplies, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirus-medical-
supplies-137658. 
156 Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Jack Nicas, Swept Up by FEMA’: Complicated Medical Supply 
System Sows Confusion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/coronavirus-fema-medical-
supplies.html. 
157 Id. (“In Kentucky, the head of a hospital system told members of Congress that his 
broker had pulled out of an agreement to deliver four shipments of desperately needed 
medical gear after the supplies were commandeered by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.”). 
158 Id. (“Gov. Jared Polis of Colorado thought his state had secured 500 ventilators before 
they were “swept up by FEMA.”). 
159 These redirections of medical equipment from states to the federal government were 
a consequence of a federal administration working group headed by Jared Kushner. See 
Jonathan Allen et al., Behind closed doors, Trump's coronavirus task force boosts industry and sows 
confusion, NBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2020, 8:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-
house/trump-s-coronavirus-task-force-amassed-power-it-boosted-industry-n1180786. See 
also id. (“At the same time Trump and other White House officials are saying that it is up to 
states, cities and hospitals to find and acquire their own medical supplies, the task force is 
undermining those efforts by cutting deals with companies to re-route equipment away from 
lower-level buyers.”). 

















we file statements of interest and side with the plaintiffs.’”160 These threats 
were particularly bizarre coming from the federal government, because they 
existed in tension with the CDC’s guidelines, which promoted many of the 
state policies that Barr hoped to quash. 
Finally, the federal government engaged in self-undermining. President 
Trump often flouted his administration’s own guidance for reopening. For 
example, he refused to wear a mask, despite his administration’s guidance to 
the contrary161 (and ultimately contracted COVID-19 himself162). He praised 
states that re-opened, even when those states did not meet the federal 
guidelines for re-opening.163 He rejected draft CDC guidelines for reopening 
the economy.164 And he criticized his own experts’ judgments on how and 
 
160 See James Hohman, The Daily 202: Barr memo threatening lawsuits against coronavirus 






Barr specifically noted that one of his “point men” for this legal issue would be the United 
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, which is significant because President 
Trump had previously engaged in Twitter attacks with the Michigan Governor over her re-
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Being in an election year, President Trump had political motivations for downplaying 
the severity of the pandemic, as well. 
164 See Abby Goodnough & Maggie Haberman, White House Rejects C.D.C.’s Coronavirus 
Reopening Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), 
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were overly prescriptive, infringed on religious rights and risked further damaging an 
economy that Mr. Trump was banking on to recover quickly.”). 

















when to reopen schools.165 
In sum, governments of all kinds undermined each other during the early 
pandemic response. In some cases, this allowed less powerful local 
governments to voice disagreement with higher level governments, and it 
allowed states to bring their local governments into check. In other cases, it 
allowed the federal government to diminish the effectiveness of state and local 
pandemic policies. 
 
2. Passive: Abdication 
 
Another prominent intergovernmental behavior during the early 
pandemic response was abdication of responsibility. Government officials at 
all levels declined to exercise their authority. We define abdication to occur 
in two situations. First, when one government has a legal obligation to act, 
and declines to. Second, and more commonly, when a problem can only be 
comprehensively addressed at one level of government, and that government 
declines to act.166 Like undermining, abdication is a feature of multi-layered 
governance.167 Our contemporary federal system is built such that each layer 
of government has responsibilities, but those responsibilities overlap in ways 
that allow for intergovernmental substitution.168 
 
165 See Katie Rogers, Trump Pointedly Criticizes Fauci for His Testimony to Congress, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/us/politics/fauci-trump-
coronavirus.html (“President Trump on Wednesday criticized congressional testimony 
delivered a day earlier by Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, the nation’s top infectious disease expert, 
who had warned against reopening the country too quickly and stressed the unknown effects 
the coronavirus could have on children returning to school.”). 
For more examples, see Camacho & Glicksman, Structured to Fail: Lessons from the Trump 
Administration's Faulty Pandemic Planning and Response, supra note [], at 23-25. 
166 This definition excludes situations where one level of government has the authority 
but not the obligation to act, and credibly believes the problem is best addressed at lower 
levels of government and makes the considered decision not to act. 
167 See generally Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839 
(2017) (describing how states regularly abdicate their federal responsibilities to local 
governments). 
168 For example, the federal government abdicates when it imposes responsibilities onto 
states without providing funding. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is one example: 
the ADA prohibits governments from excluding persons with disability from programs and 
services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In practice, this provision requires states and local 
governments to spend money making their public services accessible to persons with 
disabilities, but the federal government provides no money to assist states and local 
governments in complying. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1083, 1099 & n.92 (2018). 
States abdicate when federal laws make them responsible for certain tasks—like 
















By far the most prominent abdicator during the early pandemic response 
was the White House. The porous nature of our states169 joined with the 
highly infectious nature of COVID-19 and the resource-intensive treatment 
for the virus to make a purely state response to the pandemic inadequate.170 
Yet, as it became clear that the pandemic required national action to prevent 
widespread disease and inequality, the federal government “declined to 
pursue a unified national strategy”171 and instead abdicated its responsibilities 
to both slow the spread of the disease and prevent unequal burdens caused 
by the disease.172 
Although Congress enacted economic relief legislation and national 
border controls, neither Congress nor the President enacted public health 
laws or issued comprehensive guidance for states and local governments to 
follow during the early days of the pandemic. As a result, states and local 
governments were initially operating without adequate information about the 
nature of the disease. As one report detailed, “cities and counties wrestled 
with how to handle individuals who tested positive or were placed under 
mandatory quarantine, and in the end, who was going to pay for it all. With 
scant information about the virus and no warnings against large gatherings, 
cities such as New Orleans moved ahead in February with massive 
celebrations that may have turned them into hotspots for the virus.”173 
 
administering election laws, for instance—and they fail to fulfill their responsibilities, forcing 
local governments to pick up the slack. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 747, 755-64 (2016) (describing federal election laws that impose election-
related responsibilities onto states, which in turn abdicate those responsibilities, forcing local 
governments to fill in). 
169 See Noah Bierman et al., Can Trump Reopen the Economy on May 1? Not Really, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-
10/coronavirus-trump-reopen-economy-obstacles (“Pulling back from a nationwide system 
of social distancing too soon could spur new hot spots. ‘The big challenge is that [state and 
local] borders are porous, no matter how much we talk about lockdowns,’ said Jeffrey Levi, 
a public health expert at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.” (alteration in 
original)). 
170 See supra Section I.A.1. 
171 See Sarah Mervosh, Mike Baker, Patricia Mazzei & Mark Walker, One Year, 400,000 
Coronavirus Deaths: How the U.S. Guaranteed Its Own Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/17/us/covid-deaths-2020.html. 
172 See David E. Pozen & Kim Lane Scheppele, Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and 
Otherwise, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming Oct. 2020), 
https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649816 (noting that in the 
United States, “the national executive’s efforts to control the pandemic [has] been 
disastrously insubstantial and insufficient”). 
173 Nicole Dungca, et al., As Trump Declared Coronavirus Under Control, Local Leaders Faced 
Confusion and Chaos As Cases Piled up, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2020), 

















The federal government also abdicated by failing to provide adequate 
testing and medical equipment to states. Although the federal government 
began by spearheading efforts at developing and rolling out diagnostic tests, 
its early failures soon led federal agencies to lift restrictions on testing so that 
others could fill the gap.174 Despite this additional flexibility, states simply 
lacked the resources to acquire sufficient tests and medical equipment to treat 
the onslaught of COVID-19 patients. The states hit hardest at the beginning 
of the pandemic made it clear that they did not have adequate treatment 
equipment—including ventilators for patients and masks to protect medical 
workers175—and made specific requests to the federal government for these 





174 For example, the CDC lifted all individual restrictions on testing on March 3, U.S. 
Will Drop Limits on Virus Testing, Pence Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/world/coronavirus-live-news-updates.html#link-
79b1dbc8 (“Vice President Mike Pence said the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
was lifting all restrictions on testing for coronavirus.”), and HHS granted states additional 
flexibility to approve diagnostic tests on March 13, see 85 Fed. Reg. 15,335 (Mar. 13, 2020) 
(“Should additional States request flexibility to authorize laboratories within the State to 
develop and perform tests used to detect COVID-19, the Secretary shall take appropriate 
action, consistent with law, to facilitate the request.”). 
175 See, e.g., Luz Lazo et al., Maryland and Virginia Governors Blast Trump over Protests and Lack 
of Coronavirus Testing As Cases Continue to Rise in the Capital Region, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/maryland-and-virginia-governors-blast-trump-
over-protests-and-lack-of-covid-19-testing-as-cases-continue-to-rise-in-the-capital-
region/2020/04/19/0b878724-81d1-11ea-a3ee-13e1ae0a3571_story.html (“‘We are 
fighting a biological war, and we have been asked as governors to fight that war without the 
supplies we need,’ [Virginia Governor Ralph] Northam said Sunday on CNN’s ‘State of the 
Union,’ . . . . ‘Every governor in America has been pushing and fighting and clawing to get 
more tests, not only from the federal government, but from every private lab in America and 
from across the world,’ Hogan said. ‘It’s nowhere near where it needs to be.’”); Greg Sargent, 
As Trump’s failures mount, one governor sounds an ominous warning, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/09/trumps-failures-mount-one-
governor-sounds-an-ominous-warning (“As dogged reporting has shown, the federal 
government’s handling of medical supply chains has left states and health-care providers 
scrambling in a state of confusion and without badly needed supplies.”). 
California, on the other hand, quickly decided to work around the federal government 
and leverage its formidable economy in order to produce sufficient supplies. See Phil Willon, 
California to get more than 200 million masks a month in coronavirus fight, Gov. Newsom says, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-
07/california-gavin-newsom-200-million-masks-coronavirus-rachel-maddow (“‘Let’s use the 
power, the purchasing power of the state of California, as a nation-state,’ Newsom told 
MSNBC host Rachel Maddow.”). 
176 See, e.g., Robert Farley, Trump’s Misleading Ventilator Counter-Punch at Cuomo, 
















for help from mayors and governors, stating that “‘[g]overnors are supposed 
to be doing a lot of this work . . . . The Federal government is not supposed 
to be out there buying vast amounts of items and then shipping. You know, 
we’re not a shipping clerk.’”177 Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and 
advisor, communicated a similar sentiment: “You have instances where in 
cities, they're running out, but the state still has a stockpile, and the notion of 
the federal stockpile was it's supposed to be our stockpile, it’s not supposed to 
be state stockpiles that they then use . . . .”178 
As the federal government abdicated, other actors stepped into the void. 
Individual states and local governments filled the gap as best they could. Some 
state and local orders “preceded federal directives by days or even weeks as 
local officials sifted through news reports and other sources of information to 
educate themselves about the risks posed by the coronavirus.”179 Gavin 
Newsom, the Governor of California, announced California’s independence 
from the federal government and “declared that California [would] chart its 
own course, relying less on the White House and leveraging its considerable 
economic power as ‘a nation-state.’”180 Michael Hancock, the mayor of 
Denver, Colorado, similarly noted how responsibility had fallen to state and 
local leaders: “Governors and mayors have had to make the tough decisions 
that Washington has refused to make . . . . It wasn’t the president who decided 
to shut cities, schools, businesses down, . . . [a]nd it won’t be his call to get 
 
FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/trumps-
misleading-ventilator-counter-punch-at-cuomo/ (“Cuomo said at a press conference on 
March 24 that the state had an urgent need for more ventilators to deal with an anticipated 
peak in demand in two weeks for patients needing help to breathe. . . . ‘The only way we can 
obtain these ventilators is from the federal government. Period.’”). 
177 Quint Forgery, ‘We’re not a shipping clerk’: Trump Tells Governors to Step up Efforts to Get 
Medical Supplies, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirus-medical-
supplies-137658. 
178 Nolan D. McCaskill & Alice Miranda Ollstein, Trump Administration Tells States to Step 
up As Governors Plead for Aid, POLITICO (Apr. 5, 2020, 9:37 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/05/white-house-trump-funding-states-
coronavirus-165783. 
179 Nicole Dungca, et al., As Trump Declared Coronavirus Under Control, Local Leaders Faced 




180 Noah Bierman et al., Can Trump Reopen the Economy on May 1? Not Really, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-10/coronavirus-
trump-reopen-economy-obstacles. 
















everyone back to work in terms of our states and our cities.”181 
In cases where no governmental actors at any level took action, people 
were left with corporate governance.182 Private corporations and universities 
filled gaps left by governments by voluntarily shutting down their physical 
workspaces and campuses,183 helping to provide scarce PPE to hospitals,184 
giving COVID-19 tests to employees when governmental testing was not 
available,185 and increasing the availability of vaccines.186 
Finally, governments also abdicated their responsibilities to fight 
COVID-related inequality. As others have described, the COVID-19 
pandemic has affected us unequally.187 African Americans, Latinos, and 
Native Americans have become infected with and died from COVID-19 at 
higher rates than Whites.188 The pandemic has also had a disparate effect on 
 
181 Id. 
182 The Mayor of Las Vegas, Nevada, for example, stated that casinos should open and 
that they—and not the local government—were responsible for ensuring that they could 
open safely. Justin Wise, Las Vegas mayor doubles down on push to reopen casinos, says it's not her job 
to do it safely: 'They better figure it out,' THE HILL (Apr. 22, 2020, 5:07 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/494193-las-vegas-mayor-doubles-down-on-
push-to-reopen-casinos-says-its-not-her. 
183 See Claire Duffy, Big tech firms ramp up remote working orders to prevent coronavirus spread, 
CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 12, 2020, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/tech/google-work-from-home-
coronavirus/index.html; Betsy Foresman, Here are the U.S. universities that have closed due to 
coronavirus, EDSCOOP (Mar. 13, 2020), https://edscoop.com/universities-closed-due-
coronavirus-2020/ (“Over the past week, nearly 300 U.S. universities have announced plans 
to move classes online in response to the coronavirus pandemic.”). 
184 See Office of the Mayor, Kamaria Hightower, City Surpasses 700,000 Items in PPE 
Collection (Apr. 29, 2020), https://durkan.seattle.gov/2020/04/city-surpasses-700000-items-
in-ppe-collection/ (“[C]ompanies, organizations, and individuals have contributed over 
700,000 pieces of personal protective equipment (PPE) to the City of Seattle . . . .”). 
185 See Noam Scheiber, How Companies Are Getting Speedy Coronavirus Tests for Employees, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/economy/employers-coronavirus-
testing.html. 
186 See Gillian Friedman & Lauren Hirsch, Help With Vaccination Push Comes From Unexpected 
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/business/vaccines-microsoft-amazon-
starbucks.html. 
187 See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, the Government’s 
Pandemic Response, and Racial Inequities in COVID-19, 70 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3763532. 
188 As of November 10, 2020, the CDC reported that African Americans were 
approximately 140% more likely to be infected with COVID-19 than Whites, Latinos were 
approximately 170% more likely, and Native Americans were approximately 180% more 
















women. The sectors of the economy that the pandemic has hit hardest are 
those that disproportionately employ women: restaurants, retail businesses, 
health care, and state and local governments.189 And the closure of schools 
and daycare facilities has created another burden—childcare—that women 
disproportionately bear.190 The pandemic has caused intersectional 
inequality as well.191 Women of color experienced not just the diminished 
health outcomes associated with communities of color broadly, but also the 
economic pressures the pandemic imposed on women.192 
 
likely. African Americans were 370% more likely than Whites to be hospitalized with 
COVID-19, and 280% more likely to die from it. Latinos were 400% more likely than Whites 
to be hospitalized with COVID-19, and 260% more likely to die from it. And Native 
Americans were 410% more likely than Whites to be hospitalized with COVID-19, and 
280% more likely to die from it. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 
Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, Nov. 30, 2020, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-
discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html. See also Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., 
The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-
americans-cdc-data.html. 
Racial disparities continued into the later pandemic stages as well: African Americans 
and Latinos have been disproportionately under-vaccinated compared to their White 
counterparts. Abby Goodnough & Jan Hoffman, The Wealthy Are Getting More Vaccinations, Even 
in Poorer Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/health/white-people-covid-vaccines-
minorities.html. See also Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Black and Latino New Yorkers Trail White 
Residents in Vaccine Rollout, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/nyregion/nyc-covid-vaccine-race.html. 
189 See Patricia Cohen, Recession With a Difference: Women Face Special Burden, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/business/economy/women-jobs-
economy-recession.html. 
190 See Titan Alon et al., The impact of Covid-19 on gender equality, COVID ECONOMICS 62, 
63 (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~mdo738/research/Alon_Doepke_Olmstead-
Rumsey_Tertilt_COVID_2020.pdf (“Based on the existing distribution of child care duties 
in most families, mothers are likely to be more affected [by increased childcare needs] than 
fathers.”). 
191 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991) (describing how “intersecting 
patterns of racism and sexism . . . “tend not to be represented within the discourses of either 
feminism or antiracism”).  
192 As Drs. Jackson and Peterson put it, “Black women sit squarely at the confluence of 
multiple systems of oppression, and are experiencing a disproportionate loss of life and 
livelihood in the era of COVID-19.” Brandi Jackson & Aderonke B. Pederson, Facing both 
covid-19 and racism, Black women are carrying a particularly heavy burden, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/04/facing-both-covid-19-
racism-black-women-are-carrying-particularly-heavy-burden/. Multiple studies have also 
















Although addressing inequality may not seem like an intergovernmental 
problem, it is. The pandemic was superimposed atop all of our existing 
societal and economic inequalities. Without affirmative governmental 
intervention, inequality reproduces itself in new contexts—even without 
intentionally discriminatory action along racial or gender lines.193 And given 
the infectious nature of COVID-19, poor outcomes and greater disease 
spread in some locations and communities is bound to spillover and threaten 
more effective disease control in others. 
In other words: inequality in; inequality out. The pandemic was bound to 
reproduce a highly unequal society unless those in power took action to 
disrupt that reproduction. But local governments experiencing these 
inequalities did not have the resources to disrupt the kind of systemic 
inequality that COVID-19 unleashed, and at least in the early months, aid 
from states and the federal government for that purpose did not come.194 




shown that Latinas have experienced greater COVID-related unemployment than either 
White women or Latinx men. See Economic Policy Institute, Elise Gould, Daniel Perez & 
Valerie Wilson, Latinx workers—particularly women—face devastating job losses in the COVID-19 
recession, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/latinx-workers-covid/; Pew Research Center, Rakesh 
Kochhar, Hispanic women, immigrants, young adults, those with less education hit hardest by COVID-19 
job losses (June 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/09/hispanic-
women-immigrants-young-adults-those-with-less-education-hit-hardest-by-covid-19-job-
losses/. 
193 See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK 
IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 4 (2014) (“[R]acial inequality reproduces itself automatically from 
generation to generation.”); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography 
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1852 (1994) (“[E]ven in the absence of racism, 
race-neutral policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic 
stratification in a society with a history of racism.”). 
194 See Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, the Government’s Pandemic 
Response, and Racial Inequities in COVID-19, supra note [], at 2. 
In later months, some governments began focusing on inequality. The federal American 
Rescue Plan Act, for example, which came a year into the pandemic, provided money for 
loans to businesses in “underserved areas, especially those that are minority-owned.” Jeanne 
Sahadi, What's in the $1.9 trillion rescue plan for small businesses, CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 25, 2021), 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/success/rescue-plan-small-businesses-
feseries/index.html. California’s reopen plan, as another example, explicitly incorporates 
health equity measures. See Emily A. Largent et al., Incorporating Health Equity Into 
COVID-19 Reopening Plans: Policy Experimentation in California, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306263. 
















B.  Coordination 
 
Although the most visible intergovernmental behavior may have been 
conflict, the pandemic response also engendered intergovernmental 
coordination. Like conflict, intergovernmental coordination is a feature of our 
decentralized system of governance.195 Without an existing blueprint for a 
coordinated governance response, two forms of impromptu coordination 
emerged. This Section provides an account of government officials actively 
coordinating through horizontal and vertical collaboration, as well as 
passively coordinating through bandwagoning. Whereas collaboration 
involves explicit efforts to work together, bandwagoning involves similar 
decisions cascading across the same or different levels of government as later 
actors follow in the footsteps of earlier actors. 
 
1. Active: Collaboration 
 
Lower levels of government sometimes filled the gaps created by the lack 
of comprehensive governance by engaging in horizontal and vertical 
collaboration. Horizontal collaboration occurred when lower-level 
authorities work with others at the same level, forming horizontal networks 
for sharing practices, harmonizing policies, and coordinating efforts. These 
networks were either created ad hoc or repurposed from pre-existing 
networks. Generally, horizontal networks are often regional in geography and 
include governments with similar political leanings, as adjacent jurisdictions 
take joint action to combat a common problem. But they may also form 
between far-flung jurisdictions that face similar challenges. These horizontal 
networks allowed states to share knowledge and can help to equalize resource 
differences between them.196 
Horizontal collaboration became increasingly prevalent as the pandemic 
persisted and effective higher-level governance failed to materialize. One of 
the earliest examples is the joint Bay Area order on March 16 requiring 
residents in seven adjacent counties to stay home and to limit activities and 
 
195 See Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, supra note [], at 1085 (noting that 
because our governments are fractured and varied, compliance with various federal laws 
requires extensive coordination between governments). 
196 See Ann O'M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 535, 544 (2004) (“[M]ore capable states cooperate by engaging in 
multistate legal action, and less capable states cooperate by adopting uniform state laws”). See 
also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377 (2018) (discussing ways 
that states create both regional and non-regional networks with one another for various 
purposes). 
















businesses to those defined as “essential.”197 The order pre-dated a similar 
California-wide order and resulted from the public health officers of 
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara 
counties coordinating a unified strategy across the seven jurisdictions. The 
Bay Area counties also worked together to devise a unified set of reporting 
requirements for labs that test for COVID-19.198 On April 2, they jointly 
recommended that residents use face coverings when performing essential 
activities.199 On the east coast, Governor Cuomo announced on April 22 that 
New York would coordinate its contact tracing program with New Jersey and 
Connecticut.200  
Horizontal collaboration has also been used to confront shortages in 
medical and personal protective equipment, given the federal government’s 
failure to act as a central supplier. In early April, California’s Governor 
Newsom ordered 200 million masks a month and noted that California was 
looking to coordinate rather than compete with other states in procuring 
them.201 In mid-April, New York state gave a hundred ventilators to 
Michigan and fifty to Maryland.202 By May, the governors of New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts announced a multi-state agreement to create a regional supply 
 
197 See, e.g., Santa Clara County Public Health Press Release, Seven Bay Area Jurisdictions 
Order Residents to Stay Home (May 16, 2020), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/phd/news/Pages/press-release-03-16-20.aspx. This initial 
three-week order was subsequently extended by all seven counties. See, e.g., Order of the 
Health Officer of Santa Clara (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/covid19/Pages/order-health-officer-033120.aspx. 
198 See, e.g., Joint Press Release, Seven Bay Area Jurisdictions Order Laboratories Testing for 
COVID-19 to Report More Comprehensive Testing Data to State and Local Authorities (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://cchealth.org/press-releases/2020/0324-Media-Statement-Lab-Reporting-
Order.pdf.  
199 See, e.g., Santa Clara County Public Health Press Release, Bay Area Public Health 
Departments Recommend Non-Medical Face Coverings During Essential Outings (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/phd/news/Pages/non-medical-face-coverings.aspx.  
200 Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo and Mayor Mike Bloomberg Launch 
Nation-Leading COVID-19 Contact Tracing Program to Control Infection Rate (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomo-
and-mayor-mike-bloomberg-launch-nation-leading.  
201 Jeremy B. White, Katy Murphy & Carla Marinucci, Newsom: California’s Enormous 
Mask Order Won’t Disrupt Supply Chain for Others, POLITICO (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/08/newsom-californias-
enormous-mask-order-wont-disrupt-supply-chain-for-others-1274110.  
202 Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo Issues Executive Order Requiring All People 
in New York to Wear Masks or Face Coverings in Public (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomo-
issues-executive-order-requiring-all-people-new.  

















chain for personal protective and other medical equipment.203 
The processes of loosening social distancing requirements and resuming 
economic activities were particularly shaped by horizontal collaboration. 
Several regional networks emerged. On the west coast, California, Oregon, 
and Washington entered into an agreement to devise a coordinated approach 
for reopening their economies.204 The states jointly developed a shared vision 
of when it was safe to reopen and worked together to ensure that there was 
enough testing supplies and contact tracing staff.205 Colorado and Nevada 
subsequently joined the Western States Pact, creating an alliance between the 
five Democratic governors.206 On the east coast, the governors of seven 
states—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut—created a multistate task force to reopen 
their economies in a coordinated way.207 New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut also coordinated the reopening of marinas and boatyards.208 In 
the Midwest, the governors of seven states—Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky—created a partnership to 
 
203 States agreed to work together to aggregate their demand, reduce costs with greater 
purchasing power, stabilize the supply chain, and coordinate policies regarding stockpiling 
personal protective equipment. Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo, Governor 
Murphy, Governor Lamont, Governor Wolf, Governor Carney, Governor Raimondo & Governor Baker 
Announce Joint Multi-State Agreement to Develop Regional Supply Chain for PPE and Medical Equipment 
(May 3, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-
governor-cuomo-governor-murphy-governor-lamont-governor-wolf.  
204 California, Oregon & Washington Announce Western States Pact (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/04/13/california-oregon-washington-announce-western-
states-pact/.  
205 Joseph O’Sullivan & Paul Roberts, Washington, Oregon and California to Coordinate 






206 Inslee announces Colorado & Nevada will join Washington, Oregon & California in Western States 
Pact (April 27, 2020), https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-announces-
colorado-nevada-will-join-washington-oregon-california-western-states.  
207 Ben Chapman and Jimmy Vielkind, Seven Northeast States Start to Plan Reopening 
Coronavirus-Hit Economy, WALL ST, J. (Apr. 13, 2020, 6:50 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-officials-begin-planning-re-opening-of-regions-
economy-as-coronavirus-eases-11586802819.  
208 Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo, Governor Murphy, Governor Lamont 
Announce Alignment of State Policies for Marinas and Boatyards (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomo-
governor-murphy-governor-lamont-announce.  
















coordinate the reopening of their regional economy.209 Republican governors 
also networked secretly on questions like mask wearing and business 
restrictions as they broke with the President’s inaction.210  
Mayors and other municipal officials across the country and around the 
world have also connected formally and informally with each other to share 
their experiences facing similar challenges. C40, an existing network of over 
forty megacities formally committed to collaboratively addressing climate 
change,211 was temporarily repurposed to address the pandemic. Mayors 
convened over Zoom to share knowledge and best practices, reporting strong 
feelings of solidarity free of the geopolitical pressures that shaped interactions 
between their national counterparts.212 In April, C40 launched the Global 
Mayors COVID-19 Recovery Task force, which was led by the mayor of 
Milan and includes the Secretary for the Environment of Hong Kong and the 
mayors of Freetown, Lison, Rotterdam, Medellín, Melbourne, Montréal, 
New Orleans, Seattle, and Seoul.213  
The Deputy Mayor for International Affairs of Los Angeles, Nina 
Hachigian, also created a WhatsApp group of city leaders below the mayoral 
level, which proved useful for fast information exchange. Through the 
WhatsApp group, Hachigian connected with the heads of emergency 
management departments of other cities, providing each other with moral 
support, technical advice, and, occasionally, personal protective 
equipment.214 
 
209 Midwest Governors Announce Partnership to Reopen Regional Economy (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90640-526088--,00.html.  
210 Alexander Burns, Jonathan Martin, & Maggie Haberman, As Trump Ignores Virus 
Crisis, Republicans Start to Break Ranks, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/us/politics/republicans-contradict-trump-
coronavirus.html.  
211 See C40 Cities, https://www.c40.org/about (“C40 is a network of the world’s 
megacities committed to addressing climate change. C40 supports cities to collaborate 
effectively, share knowledge and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on 
climate change.”).  
212 Global city cooperation in the response to COVID-19, BROOKINGS (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/events/webinar-global-city-cooperation-in-the-response-to-
covid-19/.  
213 11 Mayors Unite to Lead Global Mayors COVID-19 Recovery Task Force, C40 CITIES (Apr. 
29, 2020), https://www.c40.org/press_releases/11-mayors-unite-global-mayors-covid-19-
task-force. 
214 The Director of International Affairs for Milan, Maria Vittoria Beria, noted that 
networking with other cities allowed Milan to receive shipments of medical and personal 
protective equipment from Chinese cities early in the pandemic. Global city cooperation in the 
response to COVID-19, BROOKINGS (Apr. 23, 2020), 
















Vertical collaboration occurs when authorities at different levels explicitly 
work together to share practices, align policies, and coordinate efforts. Like 
horizontal networking, vertical networking is a natural consequence of our 
federal system.215 Vertical collaboration can benefit both more centralized 
and more decentralized governments: it allows centralized governments to 
expand their influence and provides more decentralized governments with 
resources they may lack. 
Vertical collaboration occurred between the federal government and the 
states during the early pandemic response. In April, for example, Vice 
President Pence spoke with all fifty state governors and provided each with a 
list of laboratories with additional testing capacity within their respective 
states.216 President Trump later promised to help both California217 and New 
York218 increase testing supplies. There was a general agreement that the 
federal government would be responsible for managing international supply 
chains and ensuring that manufacturers have sufficient materials, while the 
states would be responsible for running laboratories.219 




215 Sub-federal governments “cooperate with the federal government in many 
policymaking areas . . . . [and] help implement federal policy in a variety of ways: by 
submitting implementation plans to federal agencies, by promulgating regulations, and by 
bringing administrative actions to enforce federal statutes.” See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998). 
216 White House Press Briefing, Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members 
of the Coronavirus Task Force is Press Briefing (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-29/. 
217 Gov. Newsom: President Trump Promises Hundreds Of Thousands More Coronavirus Testing 
Swabs For California, LAIST (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:40 AM) 
https://laist.com/latest/post/20200422/gov-newsom-coronavirus-reopening-california-
covid-19-update (“[Governor Newsom] said President Donald Trump had just directly 
promised him significant numbers of swabs over the next few weeks.”) 
218 Peter Baker & Jesse McKinley, Trump and Cuomo Put Aside Disputes During White House 
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/politics/trump-andrew-cuomo-meeting.html 
(“Mr. Cuomo said that he secured a commitment from the president to try to increase the 
number of tests in New York for both the coronavirus and the antibodies to 40,000 a day.”) 
219 Kevin Breuninger et al., Gov. Cuomo says Trump wants to help New York double coronavirus 
testing rate, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2020, 11:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/21/new-
york-gov-cuomo-says-he-will-discuss-coronavirus-testing-with-trump-at-white-house-
meeting.html 
















overlapping jurisdictions instituted “shelter in place” policies. The city of 
Seattle, for example, aligned with King County and Washington state in early 
closures.220 Santa Clara County acknowledged Governor Newsom’s stay-at-
home order, “urg[ing] all residents to comply with the restrictions in both the 
County and State orders.”221 Ventura County’s shut down order on March 
20 repeatedly referenced Governor Newsom’s executive order and 
emphasized that it should be “interpreted . . . to be consistent with and in 
furtherance of the Governor’s Executive Order.”222 Meanwhile, Mississippi’s 
Governor Tate Reeves issued a supplement to the state-wide executive order, 
clarifying that local government shut downs instituted prior to the state’s 
order continued to be valid “so long as they provide the minimum applicable 
restrictions” set out in the state-wide order.223 
 
2. Passive: Bandwagoning 
 
As governments began to act, they often built off of and influenced each 
other, even when they were not explicitly collaborating. We call this behavior 
“bandwagoning,” a dynamic of passive coordination in which similar 
decisions cascaded across the same or different levels of government. This 
domino effect could be rapid, as authorities mimicked each other in quick 
succession and earlier actors made it easier for subsequent actors to follow. 
Bandwagoning is similar to the political science concept of policy imitation, “a 
sort of herding activity, wherein states are hesitant to be first movers but also 
do not desire to be left behind and appear out of sync with others, especially 
if doing so casts a negative light on elected policy makers.”224 
 
220 Mayor Durkan aligned Seattle’s policies on the closure of facility and suspension of 
permits with Washington Governor Inslee’s statewide shut down order. Anthony Derrick, 
Mayor Jenny Durkan Issues Executive Order to Align City Policies with Extended ‘Stay Home, Stay Healthy’ 
Order (Apr. 6, 2020), https://durkan.seattle.gov/2020/04/mayor-jenny-durkan-issues-
executive-order-to-align-city-policies-with-extended-stay-home-stay-healthy-order/  
221 County of Santa Clara Statement on Governor Newsom’s Executive Order for All Californians to 
Stay at Their Home (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/phd/news/Pages/press-
statement-governors-executive-order.aspx.  
222 Ventura County Health Officer, Stay Well at Home (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://s30623.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/StayWellAtHomeOrder.pdf. 
223 Office of the Mississippi Governor, Supplement to Executive Order No. 1463 (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/Education-
Publications/ExecutiveOrders/SupplementEO1463.pdf. 
224 See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 840, 842-43 (2008); Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion in Polarized Times: The Case of the 
Affordable Care Act, 42 J. OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 363, 367-68 (2017) 
(“Imitation involves the copying of a policy found elsewhere without regard to its 
effectiveness.”).  















Bandwagoning occurred at both the international and domestic levels. It 
operated both in defiance of as well as in the absence of policy guidance from 
higher levels of government. Bandwagoning was particularly striking when it 
occurred across jurisdictions at different stages of the outbreak, suggesting 
that it was less about putting in place an appropriate response to the 
pandemic than it was about joining an emerging crowd and gaining political 
cover.  
Internationally, bandwagoning describes how countries responded to the 
WHO’s characterization of COVID-19. The WHO declared COVID-19 a 
public health emergency of international concern on January 30 and a 
pandemic on March 11.225 At the March 11 declaration, WHO’s Director-
General urged countries to “strike a fine balance between protecting health, 
minimizing economic and social disruption, and respecting human rights” 
and emphasized that describing the outbreak as a pandemic “doesn’t change 
what countries should do.”226 The WHO recommended phased measures 
based on the extent of disease spread. Depending on each country’s 
assessment of its outbreak severity, WHO suggested considering restricting 
social gatherings, closing workplaces and schools, and quarantining 
asymptomatic contacts.227 Yet, a study of over 160 national responses to 
COVID-19 found that most countries around the world enacted much 
stricter measures during a two-week period around mid-March, reflecting 
herd behavior rather than WHO’s guidance.228 There is little correlation 
between indicators of disease spread, such as when the first case or first death 
occurred in a country, and policy action.229 
Within the U.S., bandwagoning has also been a defining feature of 
pandemic governance behaviors. Just as stricter measures were enacted 
around the world during a two-week period around mid-March, many U.S. 
jurisdictions enacted similar measures in that timeframe despite experiencing 
different extent of disease spread.  
 
225 Archived: WHO Timeline – COVID-19 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-
room/detail/08-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 (visited July 19, 2020).  
226 WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020, 
(Mar. 11, 2020) https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 (visited July 19, 2020).  
227 See World Health Organization, COVID-19 Strategy Update (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/covid-strategy-update-
14april2020.pdf?sfvrsn=29da3ba0_19. 
228 Thomas Hale et al., Pandemic governance requires understanding socioeconomic variation in 
government and citizen responses to COVID-19, at 2, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3641927. 
229 Id. at 3. 

















The decision to issue emergency declarations was one example of this 
dynamic. Jurisdictions issued states of emergency in a cluster, beginning 
around March 7. Of the states we focus on, New York, Michigan, Arizona, 
Texas, Vermont, and Mississippi all declared emergencies within a ten-day 
period,230 and a large number of local governments within those states did the 
same. Although these declarations cascaded one after another, each 
jurisdiction was differently situated with the pandemic at the time. Rural 
Modoc County, California, declared an emergency two days after the state of 
Michigan, for example. But Modoc County did not register its first case of 
COVID-19 until early August 2020,231 whereas Michigan had reported 
nearly 400 cases by mid-March 2020.232 
The decision to issue shelter-in-place orders followed a similar dynamic. 
On March 16, seven Bay Area jointly issued an order requiring all individuals 
to shelter at their place of residence except when engaging in essential 
business.233 A cascade of similar orders from Democratic jurisdictions 
followed suit over the next few days. The City of Fresno enacted a similar 
 
230 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202, Declaring a Disaster Emergency in the State of New York (Mar. 
7, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-202-declaring-disaster-emergency-state-
new-york (New York); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-4, Declaration of State of Emergency (Mar. 
10, 2020), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-
2020/executiveorder/pdf/2020-EO-04.pdf (Michigan); Gov. Ducey declares public health 
emergency in Arizona due to coronavirus, AZ FAMILY (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.azfamily.com/news/gov-ducey-declares-public-health-emergency-in-arizona-
due-to/article_b6984d36-63c4-11ea-97ae-577cf8e7a46e.html (Arizona); Office of the Texas 
Governor, Governor Abbott Holds Press Conference On Coronavirus, Declares State Of Disaster For All 
Texas Counties (Mar. 13, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-holds-
press-conference-on-coronavirus-declares-state-of-disaster-for-all-texas-counties (Texas); Vt. 
Exec. Order No. 01-20 (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/EO%2001-
20%20Declaration%20of%20State%20of%20Emergency%20in%20Response%20to%20
COVID-19%20and%20National%20Guard%20Call-Out.pdf (Vermont); Office of the 
Mississippi Governor, Proclamation (Mar. 14, 2020), 
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/2020-
03/2.%20Original%20Mississippi%20State%20of%20Emergency.pdf (Mississippi). 
231 See Thomas Fuller & Jill Cowan, The Last California County Without a Coronavirus Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/us/california-
coronavirus-modoc-county.html (“For five months, officials in Modoc had hoped that the 
county’s isolation in the northeastern corner of the state would spare it from the virus. And 
until last week, when a couple in Alturas tested positive, Modoc had been the last county in 
California without any confirmed cases.”). 
232 See The COVID Tracking Project, https://covidtracking.com/data/state/michigan. 
233 See, e.g., Order of the Health Officer of the County of Santa Clara (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/covid19/Pages/order-health-officer-031620.aspx. 

















order on March 18,234 followed by the City of Los Angeles,235 the County of 
Los Angeles,236 and the State of California all on March 19,237 the state of 
New York on March 22,238 and the state of Washington on March 23.239 A 
number of local governments in Texas issued shelter-in-place orders on 
March 23 and 24.240 These orders came close together, despite the fact that 
the state of the pandemic differed dramatically across jurisdictions at that 
time. The imposition of mask-wearing requirements followed similar 
bandwagoning dynamics.241 
 
234 City Manager of the City of Fresno, Emergency Order 2020-02 (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.fresno.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/EMERGENCY-ORDER-2020-
02_SHELTER-IN-PLACE-3.18.20.pdf. 
235 City of Los Angeles, Public Order Under City of Los Angeles Emergency Authority: Safer At 
Home (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/-
page/file/20200527%20Mayor%20Public%20Order%20SAFER%20AT%20HOME%20
ORDER%202020.03.19%20%28REV%202020.05.27%29.pdf. 
236 County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Order of the Health Officer, 
Safer at Home Order for Control of COVID-19 (Mar. 19, 2020), 
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/1070029_COVID-
19_SaferAtHome_HealthOfficerOrder_20200319_Signed.pdf. 
237 Cal. Exec. Order N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER-03.19.2020-
002.pdf. 
238 See New York State on PAUSE, New York State Forward, 
https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/new-york-state-pause. 
239 State of Washington, Office of the Governor, Proclamation by the Governor Amending 
Proclamation 20-05, Stay Home – Stay Healthy (Mar. 23, 2020), 
http://mrsc.org/getmedia/e04ae29f-bd01-4394-803d-
0232afa7d6d8/w3stayhome.pdf.aspx. 
240   See Joshua Fetcher & Lauren Caruba, San Antonio, Bexar County residents ordered to stay 
home as local coronavirus cases climb, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Shelter-in-place-order-to-slow-
coronavirus-15151183.php (San Antonio and Bexar); Alex Samuels, Texas’ largest counties are 
issuing stay-at-home orders as coronavirus spreads, TEX. TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/23/austin-travis-county-issue-stay-home-order-
tuesday/ (Harris County, Collin County, El Paso County, and Forth Worth); Philip 
Jankowski, Coronavirus shelter-in-place order will be issued Tuesday for Travis, Williamson counties, 
STATESMAN (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.statesman.com/news/20200323/coronavirus-
shelter-in-place-order-will-be-issued-tuesday-for-travis-williamson-counties (Travis and 
Williamson Counties); Hayat Norimine, Dallas mayor issues emergency stay-at-home regulations in 
response to county’s order, DALLAS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2020),  
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/public-health/2020/03/24/dallas-mayor-issues-
emergency-stay-at-home-regulations-in-response-to-countys-order/ (Dallas). 
241 For example, the state of Mississippi, and the jurisdictions of Palo Alto, California, 
Los Angeles, California, Jackson, Mississippi, and King County, Washington, all enacted 
mask regulations in the span of a one week. See, e.g., Miss. Exec. Order No.  1483, (Mar. 14, 
2020),  https://mcusercontent.com/08cb3e52aa1308600f84d49ea/files/e1a29a19-5bea-

















III. EXPLANATIONS AND PROPOSALS 
 
hese intergovernmental behaviors—undermining and abdication, 
collaboration and bandwagoning—emerged from the policy gaps 
created by inadequate international, federal, state, and local public 
health laws that we described in Part I. In this Part, we argue that the form 
these behaviors took, although appearing fairly chaotic at first glance, follows 
a deep logic. The absence of policy guidance opened space for preexisting 
pressures, allowing the well-worn dynamics of American public life to shape 
pandemic behaviors. We focus on the two dynamics we believe to be the most 
fundamental and influential here: structure and politics. Each dynamic 
explains aspects of the behaviors that emerged, but each also interacts with 
the other. Where structural considerations—in the form of our decentralized 
mode of government—created role confusion and pushed governments 
toward conflict, politics—in the form of partisanship—provided a set of 
underlying relationships that shaped those conflicts. 
Understanding these underlying dynamics is crucial for ensuring that, 
when the next pandemic hits, we are able to respond in a way that encourages 
effective pandemic management. Although this is not primarily a prescriptive 
paper, for each explanation in this Part, we provide a high-level proposal that 
mitigates the potential for unproductive conflict and passivity. These 
proposals are not meant to represent comprehensive, pandemic-preparedness 
statutes; they are meant to be approaches for addressing governance concerns 
specifically. 
 
A.  Structure 
 
Pandemic policy lies uncomfortably on two poles of the federal-state 
division of responsibilities. Our system of federalism creates ambiguous 
hierarchies and overlapping roles, permitting—and at times, encouraging—
governments to abdicate to and undermine one another.242 Yet, during a 
pandemic that required authorities to operate in concert, this ambiguity has 
 
4df4-a30f-4a7d35418af2/Executive_Order_1483_County_Specific.pdf (Mississippi mask 
rules); City of Palo Alto, An Order by the Director of Emergency Services of the City of Palo Alto Requiring 
the Wearing of Face Coverings (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/civicax/filebank/documents/76636 (Palo Alto, California, 
mask rules); King County, Statewide requirement to wear face coverings (July 7, 2020), 
https://kingcounty.gov/depts/health/covid-19/care/masks.aspx (King County, 
Washington, mask rules). 
242 See generally PETER SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT 
CAN DO BETTER (2014). 
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systematically pushed intergovernmental interactions toward conflict, both in 
its active and passive forms. By enabling governmental abdication, it has also 
allowed inequality to take hold. 
To address this problem, we propose a federal pandemic statute that 
clarifies roles, prevents as much intergovernmental conflict as possible, 
safeguards against passivity, and disrupts inequality, while still operating 
within the framework of federalism and state independence.  
 
1. Explanation: Federalism and Role Confusion  
 
Pandemic policies implicate deep tensions in the federal organization of 
government. Neither the Constitution nor statutes enacted over the past few 
decades clearly spell out the proper roles for federal, state, and local 
governments during a widespread and protracted outbreak. As described in 
Part I, pandemic policies are at once a matter of local health, addressable by 
well-trod state police power, and a matter of national and international 
concern that require federal and WHO involvement. States and local 
governments have historically taken primary responsibility for responding to 
public health crises, employing their police power to “enact quarantine laws 
and ‘health laws of every description.’”243 But the police power is limited to 
those problems solely existing within state borders,244 leaving the federal 
government, through its enumerated powers, to take the lead on problems 
that spill beyond those borders.245 Multiple sovereigns within our system thus 
lay claim to pandemic governance, and this role confusion permeated the 
pandemic response. Public opinion data demonstrate this lack of consensus: 
37% of Americans believed that state governments were responsible for 
 
243 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, (1905) (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824)); see also supra Section I.B.1 (describing laws relating 
to disease and public health enacted by states using their police power). 
244 See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (“[T]his 
court recognized the right of a state to pass sanitary laws, laws for the protection of life, 
liberty, health, or property within its limits, laws to prevent persons and animals suffering 
under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, from coming within its borders. But, as 
the laws there involved went beyond the necessity of the case, and, under the guise of exerting 
a police power, invaded the domain of Federal authority, and violated rights secured by the 
Constitution, this court deemed it to be its duty to hold such laws invalid.”). 
245 See supra Section I.B.1 (describing the various constitutional provisions that empower 
the federal government to respond to pandemics); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25 (“A local 
enactment or regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a state, must 
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the general government of any power it 
possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures.”). 
















testing availability, and 61% believed it was a federal responsibility.246 
Ambiguity surrounding proper pandemic roles pressed governments 
toward conflict. Without clear guidelines dictating when each government 
should act or forego action, role confusion made it easier for authorities to 
abdicate their responsibility under the presumption that another authority 
would take the reins. Role confusion also caused multiple authorities to clash, 
leading to intergovernmental undermining.247 In other words, abdication and 
undermining were facilitated by the intergovernmental division of 
responsibility for enacting public health measures,248 even as an unfolding 
crisis demanded clarity. 
Role confusion caused abdication and undermining at all levels of 
government.249 At the federal level, President Trump and the executive 
branch had difficulty defining their own roles in relation to the states. After 
initially leaving the first re-open phase of the pandemic to states (abdication), 
for example, Trump claimed “total authority” to re-open the country in April 
2020.250 This assertion was met with state objections (undermining)—all 50 
states had begun their own re-opening processes by the time the Trump 
administration published its re-opening guidelines.251 Trump ultimately 
 
246 See Pew Research Center, Most Americans Say Federal Government Has Primary Responsibility 
for COVID-19 Testing (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/05/12/most-americans-say-federal-
government-has-primary-responsibility-for-covid-19-testing/. 
247 Erin Ryan calls policy areas that implicate both federal and local concerns 
“interjurisdictional gray areas,” and has chronicled how federalism-based role confusion led 
to an ineffective and disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina. See generally Erin Ryan, 
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 
66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
248 See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism Theatre in the 
Era of Shotgun Quarantine, 19 UNIV. P A. J. CONST. L. 369, 372 (2016) (“The federal 
government’s quarantine authority remains ambiguous today.”); Stephanie Cooper Blum, 
Federalism: Fault or Feature—An Analysis of Whether the United States Should Implement a Federal 
Pandemic Statute, 60 WASHBURN LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2021) (“It is unclear if the PHSA 
would be broad enough to cover mask mandates, stay-at-home orders, or other public health 
measures.”). 
249 Though we provide new examples here to illustrate the role structure played, so as 
not to be repetitive with earlier sections, the same analysis could be applied to those earlier 
examples. 
250 Jeremy B. White, Trump Claims ‘Total authority’ over State Decisions, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 
2020), https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/04/13/trump-claims-total-
authority-over-state-decisions-1275506 (“‘When somebody’s president of the United States, 
the authority is total,’ Trump said at a press briefing Monday when asked about the 
governors’ plans. ‘And that’s the way it’s got to be. It's total. It’s total. And the governors 
know that.’”). 
251 Arian Campo-Flores, Rebecca Ballhaus & Valerie Bauerlein, Behind New Covid-19 

















announced that governors would decide how and when to re-open.252  
Putting aside President Trump’s own conflicting messaging,253 the 
executive branch more broadly struggled to understand who was in charge of 
the pandemic response. The debate around mask-wearing is an example. 
CDC recommended “that people wear masks in public settings when around 
people outside of their household, especially when other social distancing 
measures are difficult to maintain.”254 Vice President Pence, however, asked 
individuals to adhere to state and local guidance: “We just believe that what’s 
most important here is that people listen to the leadership in their state and 
the leadership in their local community and adhere to that guidance whether 
it has to do with facial coverings or whether it has to do with the size of 
gatherings.”255 In providing this advice, Pence was drawing from the 
traditional understanding of states and local governments as the primary 
originators of health policy.  
Role confusion is similarly present at the state level because states and 
local governments have complicated relationships,256 with the latter 
occupying no set place in the Constitution.257 As Richard Thompson Ford 
 
Outbreaks: America’s Patchwork of Policies, WALL. ST. J. (July 9, 2020, 2:27 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-policy-covid-19-coronavirus-outbreaks-california-texas-
florida-arizona-11594134950. 
252 See Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, Trump Says States Can Start Reopening While 
Acknowledging the Decision Is Theirs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-guidelines.html 
(“President Trump told the nation’s governors on Thursday that they could begin reopening 
businesses, restaurants and other elements of daily life by May 1 or earlier if they wanted to, 
but abandoned his threat to use what he had claimed was his absolute authority to impose 
his will on them.”). 
253 See, e.g., Eliza Relman, Trump claims he’s ‘all for masks’ after refusing to publicly wear one 
himself for months, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 1, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
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254 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Your Guide to Masks (Feb. 22, 2021) 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/about-face-
coverings.html. 
255 Aamer Madhani, What to wear: Feds’ mixed messages on masks sow confusion, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 27, 2020), https://www.fox19.com/2020/06/27/what-wear-feds-mixed-
messages-masks-sow-confusion/. 
256 See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local 
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2020) (describing ways that states interfere with local 
governance). 
257 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The 
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thesis concerning the constitutional vulnerability of cities begins from the fact that cities—
unlike the states or federal government—have no set place in the American constitutional 

















notes, “[l]ocal government exists in a netherworld of shifting and 
indeterminate legal status.”258 This ambiguous netherworld made it easy for 
states to abdicate to local governments or, when it was politically 
advantageous, for both states and local governments to undermine each 
other. 
These forms of governmental conflict were rampant during the early 
months of the pandemic. In South Carolina, for example, Governor Henry 
McMaster imposed a late and short stay-at-home mandate from April 7 to 
May 4, saying that it was the responsibility of local governments to enact 
further restrictions and that a statewide mask mandate would not be enforced 
(abdication).259 Next door in North Carolina, Governor Roy Cooper imposed 
a statewide mask order only to have a dozen local sheriffs refuse to enforce it 
(undermining).260 In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis left shutdown and 
reopening decisions to local officials (abdication), but local governments 
lacked the technical expertise and healthcare professionals to make those 
decisions.261 In both Arizona and Texas, governors initially blocked local 
officials from implementing their own measures (undermining), only to 
reverse course when the outbreak exacerbated.262  
Reopening the economy was influenced by role confusion as well. In 
California, “there has been an on-again, off-again patchwork of enforcement 
on everything from business closures to wearing face masks.” Enforcement 
fell to local officials “to both interpret and enforce rapidly evolving rules, with 
state and local orders often at odds.”263 As one California police chief put it: 
“The orders are changing, you have a national narrative, you have the state, 
you have other parts of the state that are opening up and people, some people 
are confused about everything that’s going on.”264 Small businesses, in 
 
structure.”). 
258 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1864 (1994); see id. at 1886 (“Localities are neither sovereigns nor 
delegates, neither freely chosen nor wholly imposed; rather they are altogether distinct 
political agents, and as such require a distinct theory of law and justice.”). 
259 Campo-Flores, Ballhaus & Bauerlein, supra note []. 
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261 Id. (“Miami Beach Mayor Dan Gelber, a Democrat, said, “I’ve literally been on the 
phone with the [Florida] Department of Health and said, ‘What should I do?’ and the 
response has been, ‘We have to check with supervisors.’”) 
262 Id. 
263 Don Thompson, Is This Allowed? Confusing California Rules, Enforcement, NBC LOS 
ANGELES (May 10, 2020), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/coronavirus/is-this-
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particular, have struggled with the multitude of regulations and restrictions 
coming from both states and local governments.265 This is a sharp contrast to 
the “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach prescribed by 
the crisis and pandemic literatures.266  
 
2. Proposal: Role Clarity Legislation  
 
The dysfunctional intergovernmental behaviors that arose during the 
pandemic were facilitated by the absence of a clear blueprint for coordinated 
government action. Enacting federal pandemic legislation that contains such 
a blueprint in advance of the next pandemic is therefore critical,267 and should 
have twin goals. First, it should mitigate the role confusion that federalism 
and decentralized government causes. Second, it should seek to preserve the 
values of federalism and allow for limited, productive forms of state-federal 
disagreement.  
To achieve these aims, our preferred constitutional approach is to rely on 
Congress’s Spending Power. This form of federal law—akin to a federal 
contract with states268—is constitutional under most circumstances,269 well-
 
265 See Ryan Fish, “We’re incredibly shaken”: Changing bar guidelines create confusion, frustration 
for owners, KCOY (July 9, 2020), https://keyt.com/health/2020/07/09/were-incredibly-
shaken-changing-bar-guidelines-create-confusion-frustration-for-owners/ (“Confusion over 
state and local health guidelines have left some Santa Barbara bar owners rattled, as they 
attempt to modify operations in order to stay open.”). 
266 See supra Part I.A. 
267 See Hodge, National Legal Paradigms for Public Health Emergency Responses, supra note [] 
(“Vital to the development of a revamped U.S. national response plan for the Twenty-first 
century is a determination of which level of government—federal or state—should be ‘calling 
the shots’ during pandemics.”). 
268 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576-77 (2012) (describing 
Spending Clause legislation as operating “much in the nature of contract”)(quoting Barnes 
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)). 
269 Some questions exist about the extent of federal authority to issue something like a 
national lockdown. See Maryam Jamshidi, The Federal Government Probably Can’t Order Statewide 
Quarantines, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, Apr. 2020, 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/04/20/statewide-quarantines-jamshidi/. But 
there is little question that Congress could have enacted a law pursuant to its Spending Clause 
powers. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Universal Masking in the United States: The Role of Mandates, 
Health Education, and the CDC, JAMA NETWORK (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2769440 (arguing that “[a] well-
crafted use of federal spending powers” to induce states to enact mask requirements “would 
likely be constitutional”). 
There are some constitutional limits to Spending Power statutes – most importantly the 
requirement that the legislation not coerce states into accepting the deal offered by the federal 
government. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576, 580-81 (2012) 
















established in policy areas ranging from Medicaid to Food Stamps, and relies 
on buy-in from the states.270 It thus preserves many of the benefits of 
federalism, while curbing federalism’s costs for pandemic governance. 
First, to achieve role clarity, the legislation should obligate the federal 
government to lead a coordinated national response and incentivize states to 
cooperate by offering an exchange: in exchange for health care and 
pandemic-related funding provided by the federal government, the states 
would agree to regulate in specific, role-prescribed ways. For example, states 
accepting the exchange could agree to enforce guidelines set by the CDC, 
thus preventing conflicting state-federal regulations. Rather than fight with 
the federal government over testing and PPE procurement, states could agree 
to cooperate with the federal government to ensure an equitable distribution 
of those resources. And where states delegate public health responsibilities to 
local governments, states would be required to take responsibility for the 
compliance of their local governments with federal guidelines.271 The 
legislation should also mandate a role for international governance in a 
domestic response. For example, it could require the CDC to consider and 
incorporate any guidance from the WHO into its own in regulations where 
possible. Such a requirement would minimize concerns surrounding the U.S. 
reservation to the 2005 IHR, asserting the right to assume obligations 
consistent with principles of federalism described above. 
Legislation in the form of an exchange with the states would also allow 
the federal government to affirmatively disrupt inequality, thereby preventing 
that form of abdication. For example, the federal government could provide 
additional funding to states for hospitals in low-income communities and fund 
research that examines the effect of underlying medical conditions (more 
commonly experienced by minority populations) on the course of infection 
and the effectiveness of treatments. It could increase unemployment benefits 
during the pandemic, much of which would go to unemployed women. And 
it could make sure to fund vaccination sites located in communities of color 
 
(holding that Congress may not coerce states to take action by threatening to withdraw existing 
federal funding). Any Spending Clause statute therefore should not threaten to withdraw 
existing funding, but instead offer only new funding. 
270 See Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2336, 2339-43 (2020). 
271 Other federal laws accomplish role clarity in a similar way. Medicaid, for example, 
imposes responsibilities onto states, and those states may delegate those responsibilities 
downward. Federal regulations, however, ensure that that delegation does not become 
abdication by imposing monitoring requirements on states that do delegate those 
responsibilities to local governments. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.903. The Food Stamp Act accounts 
for decentralization as well. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(s) (broadly defining “state agency” under the 
statute to include “the local offices thereof, which ha[ve] the responsibility for the 
administration of the federally aided public assistance programs within such State.”). 
















and open during nonwork hours. 
Second, the legislation should promote the values of federalism by giving 
states the power of both exit and voice.272 In particular, the statute should 
promote two values of federalism most relevant to pandemic governance273: 
it should allow states to tailor their regulations to their localized needs274 and 
it should give states some space to push back against the federal government 
in the case of federal government overreach.275  
To achieve these aims, states should be able to negotiate the details of 
their statutory responsibilities with the federal agency overseeing the 
program.276 This kind of state-specific negotiation has precedent in the 
Affordable Care Act, where federal bureaucrats made locally tailored 
concessions to states in exchange for increasing the reach of federal policy.277 
In the context of pandemic policy, negotiations should be quite flexible: the 
point is not to force states to act or refrain from action, it is to decide ahead 
of time what role each state intends to take so that when the time comes, 
federal, state, and local roles can be pre-determined. The result of this process 
would be a federal government and states (minus those that decline to 
participate, as discussed below) all committed to a coordinated and tailored 
 
272 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and 
Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013). 
273 For a description of these values, see generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987). 
274 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (arguing that federalism “assures a 
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L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) and Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for A Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)). 
275 Id. at 459 (“In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of 
liberty.”). Allowing states to resist federal policies also provides a kind of insurance policy 
against an authoritarian federal government. See David Landau, Hannah J. Wiseman, & 
Samuel Wiseman, Federalism, Democracy, and the 2020 Election, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 
(forthcoming 2021), at 16, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3744530; 
see also David Landau, Hannah J. Wiseman, & Samuel R. Wiseman, Federalism for the Worst 
Case, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1187 (2020). 
276 Negotiation of this sort of common in American federalism. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating 
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011) (“[S]tate-federal bargaining is endemic to American 
governance and pervasive in many substantive areas of law. Negotiations take place over 
both the allocation of policy or decisionmaking authority and the content of policies made 
pursuant to that authority.”). 
277 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70 STAN. 
L. REV. 1689, 1733-57 (2018) (describing the ways that states negotiated with the federal 
government to tailor the Medicaid expansion to their state-specific needs). 

















Some states, however, will decline to participate. As we have seen with 
the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, most states will accept 
significant federal funding in exchange for enacting federal priorities, but not 
all will.278 Presumably, a similar outcome would result from a federal 
pandemic policy. That result would ultimately defeat perfect uniformity in 
pandemic response. But allowing states to decline federal intervention has its 
own benefits: it will allow states on the outside of the federal statute to push 
back against federal overreach or bad judgment and ensure robust debate 
about the wisdom of the federal policy. 
 
B.  Politics 
 
Intense political polarization has transformed nearly every governance 
decision, even those that should be clear from the science, into symbolic two-
sided national battles. When federalism and decentralization created role 
confusion, politics stepped in to fill that gap. Party-based battle lines provided 
a default set of relationships and positions that became organizing principles 
for each of the four intergovernmental behaviors—pressing, pulling, and 
licensing leaders to make decisions that aligned with their respective parties. 
Partisanship provided clarity to governments where federalism provided 
ambiguity and confusion. 
To address this problem, we advocate for the creation of decentralized, 
inclusive, and nonpartisan governance networks to lessen the pull of politics. 
These networks should be both horizontal and vertical and they should be 
intentionally inclusive to prevent exclusion of lower-income or less politically 
connected governments. 
 
1. Explanation: Partisan Tribalism 
 
America is more divided by politics than ever in recent history.279 
According to a Pew Research Center survey, our political divisions “dwarf[] 
 
278 See KFF, Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map (Feb. 22, 2021), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-
interactive-map/ (demonstrating that twelve states have not accepted federal funding in 
exchange for increasing their Medicaid eligibility requirements). 
279 See Pew Research Center, The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider (Oct. 
5, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-
political-values-grows-even-wider/ (“The divisions between Republicans and Democrats on 
fundamental political values—on government, race, immigration, national security, 
environmental protection and other areas—reached record levels during Barack Obama’s 
presidency. In Donald Trump’s first year as president, these gaps have grown even larger.”). 
















other divisions in society, along such lines as gender, race and ethnicity, 
religious observance or education.”280 In addition, the pandemic hit during 
the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election, when partisanship was at its 
peak281 and the political parties distrusted each other more than ever.282 
We define partisan tribalism as the tendency for politics to co-opt 
governance decisions. Whatever the policy issue, once it becomes wrapped 
up in partisanship, it taps into the deep reservoir of resentment that exists 
between the parties. Nearly all aspects of the pandemic response have been 
touched by partisan tribalism, from aid to states283 to unemployment 
insurance284 to mask usage.285 
Partisan tribalism drives behavior in multiple ways. As a matter of party 
politics, partisan tribalism instills in politicians fear of reprisal from intraparty 
ideological disagreement. Political parties are not only more polarized than 
they have been in the past, they are also more ideologically consistent.286 Fear 
 
280 Id. 
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package.html (“Democrats hope to extend a program that increased unemployment benefits 
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285 See Lauren Aratani, How did face masks become a political issue in America?, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/29/face-masks-us-
politics-coronavirus (“A recent Pew Research Center poll found Democrats were more likely 
to say they wear masks than Republicans. This is in line with messaging from leaders within 
the two parties.”); Will Weissert & Jonathan Lemire, Face masks make a political statement in era 
of coronavirus, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 7, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/7dce310db6e85b31d735e81d0af6769c (“The decision to wear a mask 
in public is becoming a political statement — a moment to pick sides in a brewing culture 
war over containing the coronavirus. While not yet as loaded as a “Make America Great 
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follow health officials’ guidance and cover their faces against those who feel it violates their 
freedom or buys into a threat they think is overblown.”). 
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of straying from the party fold was especially prevalent among lawmakers in 
the Republican party, who faced potentially politically devastating attacks 
from Trump. As one journalist stated, “Trump’s grip on the Republican 
Party remains so strong that only a handful of GOP elected officials have 
publicly criticized him, fearful of bringing down the wrath of the president or 
his supporters.”287 
Partisan tribalism also drives behavior through the psychological 
phenomenon of cultural cognition, or “the tendency of individuals to conform 
their beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . . to values that define their 
cultural identities.”288 Changing one’s opinion about politically charged facts 
threatens one’s social and political identity. Partisan tribalism created political 
polarization on even questions of science, and polarized polling data bears 
this observation out. It suggests that Republicans are overall less concerned 
about COVID-19 than Democrats are,289 that 60% of Democrats compared 
to 12% of Republicans are “extremely concerned,”290 and that Democrats 
are twice as likely as Republicans to believe that masks should always be 
worn.291 Public health protections such as social distancing and masking have 
become political acts that “signal which side you’re on”292 and impinge on 
 
“more ideologically consistent and, as a result, further from one another”). 
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ANGELES TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-
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“core [political] beliefs.”293 
Finally, partisanship heightens the cognitive herding bias, which describes 
the tendency of decision-makers to look to others for guidance and act in 
groups.294 As decisions become more complex, and time and information 
more limited, decision-makers increasingly rely on heuristics or cognitive 
shortcuts.295 Rather than reinventing the wheel, those following the herding 
instinct tie their political fortunes to those of first movers.296 Doing so both 
reduces the cognitive demands of difficult pandemic decisions by 
piggybacking on the cognitive work of others, and transforms the unknowable 
risk of taking action into the more comfortable risk of being part of a 
collective.297 Once a governmental official jumps onto a partisan bandwagon, 
the risk associated with the action is no longer the deep uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of the action, it is the comfortable risk of advocating a joint 
position. 
Ultimately, partisan tribalism operated through these mechanisms to 
provide a default set of relationships and positions that became organizing 
principles for the four intergovernmental behaviors. In the case of 
undermining, partisan tribalism placed Republican and Democratic 
authorities in opposition as they sought to frustrate each other’s policies and 
messaging. This dynamic was particularly evident when Trump used 
undermining to diminish the effectiveness of actions taken by lower-level 
Democratic authorities. Trump’s tweets encouraging people in Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Virginia to protest state shutdowns, and the Justice 
Department’s threats to sue states that did not open quickly enough298 all 
served to reinforce party-based battle lines. 
In the case of abdication, partisan tribalism both constrained the decisions 
of authorities who feared straying from the party fold and gave them license 
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were among the last to order lockdowns and then were quick to lift them.299 
As journalist Ron Brownstein wrote at the time, the fact that conservative 
governors in Texas, Florida, and Georgia only “tightened statewide 
restrictions immediately after Trump finally let his advisers frame the full risk 
. . . underscores how much his earlier minimizing contributed to the critical 
delays in those states.”300 The desire to be faithful to the partisan tribe, in 
other words, overwhelmed other considerations. 
In the case of collaboration, partisan tribalism influenced the composition 
of horizontal networks that formed to fill the gaps created by the lack of 
comprehensive governance. Members of the same party tended to engage in 
active efforts to work together. Democratic states on the west coast—
California, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, and Nevada—frequently 
worked together.301 The same goes for Democratic states on the east coast—
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts.302 Republican governors also actively collaborated when they 
broke ranks with Trump’s inaction, though they did so in secret for fear of 
reprisal.303 
Similarly, in the case of bandwagoning, partisan tribalism made it more 
likely for members of the same party to imitate each other’s policy decisions. 
Craig Volden has written that “[p]olarization adds a wrinkle to the classic 
imitation model. No longer are policy makers solely looking to do what is 
popular or widely accepted. Now they are looking to do what is widely 
accepted within their (potentially isolated) ideological community.”304 
Accordingly, it was only after Trump finally publicly acknowledged the reality 
of the pandemic305 that Republican governors in Florida and Georgia issued 
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stay-at-home orders in decisions that were directly correlated with Trump’s 
acknowledgement.306  
 
2. Proposal: Inclusive Intergovernmental Networks 
 
While we cannot eliminate partisanship, we can lessen its influence in 
future pandemics. As we have described, politics had an outsized influence 
on pandemic governance in part because it provided a clear set of governance 
relationships that filled the gap left by the absence of pandemic statutes and 
governmental role clarity. Enacting federal pandemic legislation therefore 
begins the work of rising above partisanship. As further counterweights to 
politics, we propose the creation of alternative networks that deepen the 
grooves of the intergovernmental relationships that encourage an effective 
pandemic response. This suggestion is not purely a legislative one, as these 
networks are not necessarily the result of a federal statute. They could also 
arise through decentralized and inclusive networking efforts at all levels. 
These networks should be both subject-matter and managerial in nature, 
as well as both horizontal and vertical in orientation. Vertically, we should 
borrow from the idea of “picket fence federalism,” which is the observation 
that subject-matter officials at local, state, and federal levels often have more 
in common with one another than with other officials in their own 
governments.307 It is often the case that state and local officials are alienated 
from one another,308 but for pandemic purposes, local health officials must 
be well-connected to state health officials, and both must be well-connected 
with federal health officials. These kinds of networks could encourage 
intergovernmental coordination in a number of subject-specific areas, like 
stay-at-home orders, the distribution of medical equipment, and vaccine 
dissemination. Some vertical networks should include international 
authorities as well, so that even if one level is resistant to international 
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collaboration (like the national level, for example), other levels (like state and 
local levels) still have access to international officials.309 
Horizontally, government officials should be able to easily share with 
other similarly situated officials their experiences and lessons learned while 
fighting the pandemic. State and local government leaders should be able to 
share model ordinances and innovative approaches. These networks should 
exist at the administrator level as well: hospital officials should be able to share 
their best practices with one another, public assistance officials should be able 
to share their experiences working with people who need help, and so on.  
As described above in Part II, some networks did arise out of necessity 
during the pandemic. But these networks were ad hoc and, as a consequence, 
not fully thought through or inclusive. The mayoral networks that sprung up 
during the early months of the pandemic, for example, should be 
systematized and expanded so that all mayors, or those in certain regional 
areas, can be involved, not just those in the know or those that are politically 
aligned. These networks would serve as counterweights to pre-existing 
partisan networks: when faced with uncertainty, government officials would 
have multiple networks to fall back on. One might provide political cover, but 
others would provide policy-specific knowledge and, if the networks were 
broad and strong enough, could provide strength in numbers. 
Formalizing these networks and making them intentionally inclusive 
would also combat inequality. When jurisdictions collaborated during the 
early pandemic response, they reinforced existing inequality by falling back 
on default political networks310 and informal groupings of mayors and 
governors.311 But professional networks, unless they are intentionally 
desegregated, create inequality by entrenching existing power hierarchies.312 
Take the WhatsApp group established for health professionals below the 
mayoral level described in Section II.B.1 as an example: that was an ad hoc 
group formed through personal connections, and almost certainly excluded—
even if unintentionally—local officials in less well-connected jurisdictions. 
Intentionally inclusive networks, created prior to a future pandemic, would 
ensure that all jurisdictions, whether well-resourced or not, could enjoy the 
 
309 See generally Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and 
Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) (describing ways in which 
international priorities can enter the American legal culture through local governments, 
despite a resistant federal government). 
310 See supra Section II.B.2. 
311 See supra Section II.B.1. 
312 See ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN 
WHITE ADVANTAGE, supra note [], at 83-84. 


















CONCLUSION: PANDEMIC GOVERNANCE REDUX 
 
he pandemic has evolved. Daily COVID-19 deaths in the United 
States are a fraction of what they were at their peak.313 But we have 
new worries: unvaccinated and vaccine-resistant populations, 
countries that lack access to vaccines, and vaccine-resistant virus variants. 
Each of these problems gives rise to new governance challenges. 
In addition, President Biden’s pandemic policies differ dramatically from 
his predecessor’s. Biden has unambiguously embraced mask-wearing314 and 
signed an executive order mandating mask usage on transportation hubs and 
federal property.315 He has also signed other executive orders that adopt a 
more proactive role for the federal government,316 and signed legislation that 
funnels money from the federal government to state and local governments 
for pandemic-related costs.317 
Despite these changes, the dynamics that we describe in this Article are 
so deeply rooted in our public lives that they will continue to shape the 
pandemic even as the country transitions from one variant to another, one 
president to another. While there may be less federal abdication under 
President Biden, the polarized nature of our politics ensures ample political 
tribalism and state undermining of federal policy along party lines. When 
 
313 See Christina Morales & Isabella Grullón Paz, Coronavirus cases and deaths in the United 
States drop to lowest levels in nearly a year, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/23/us/covid-cases-vaccinations-united-states.html. 
314 Alexandra Jaffe, Among first acts, Biden to call for 100 days of mask-wearing, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 4, 2020) (“Joe Biden said Thursday that he will ask Americans to commit to 100 
days of wearing masks as one of his first acts as president . . . . The move marks a notable 
shift from President Donald Trump, whose own skepticism of mask-wearing has contributed 
to a politicization of the issue.”). 
315 See William Wan & Michael Laris, FAQ: How do Biden’s new mask orders work?, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 22, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2021/01/22/coronavirus-biden-mask-
mandate/. 
316 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Biden Unveils National Strategy That Trump Resisted, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/21/us/politics/biden-coronavirus-
response.html. 
317 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FACT SHEET: The American Rescue Plan Will Deliver 
Immediate Economic Relief to Families, Mar. 18, 2021, 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/fact-sheet-the-american-rescue-plan-
will-deliver-immediate-economic-relief-to-families (“The American Rescue Plan provides 
$350 billion dollars in emergency funding for state, local, territorial, and Tribal governments 
to remedy this mismatch between rising costs and falling revenues.”). 
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President-Elect Biden proposed his mask mandate, one Republican 
representative tweeted in response that “on day one . . . I will tell you to kiss 
my ass.”318 Within days of Biden signing his mask regulation, Republican 
operatives warned that states would begin undermining the regulations by 
filing lawsuits against it.319 And because of role ambiguity and uncertainty 
surrounding federal constitutional authority over national mask 
regulations,320 President Biden’s regulations will in part need to be “enforced 
by cooperating state and local authorities,”321 which will empower non-
cooperating jurisdictions to undermine the federal law by refusing to enforce it.  
Even beyond this pandemic, this Article’s insights provide a framework 
for governance during future crises. Many of the governance challenges 
created by the pandemic apply to other problems that are large in scope and 
require action from a multitude of overlapping authorities. Climate change, 
for example, implicates governance at international, federal, state, and local 
levels. It affects different jurisdictions differently, but requires a coordinated 
governance response.322 Governments can and do abdicate their climate 
change responsibilities, and undermine the efforts of others.323 Although 
climate change will not take us by surprise the way COVID-19 did, it may 
cause damage that we are not prepared for, like deadly hot summers, 
devastating weather systems, and unpredictable human migration. And when 
we finally do decide to take climate change seriously, the governance lessons 
that we learned from the pandemic response—including role-clarity 
legislation and governance networks that lessen the pull of politics—will be 
necessary aspects of policy changes. 
 
318 Natasha Korecki, Biden says his mask mandate is common sense. Republicans say ‘kiss my ass,’ 
POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/22/biden-mask-
mandate-461533. 
319 Id. (stating that the federal government should “expect lawsuits from our state, private 
lawsuits”). 
320 See supra Section III.A. 
321 Michael Laris, CDC issues sweeping mask mandate for planes, public transportation in U.S., 




322 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Fact sheet: Why 
climate change requires an internationally coordinated financial response, 
https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press_factsh_financing.pdf. 
323 See, e.g., Umair Irfan, Trump White House issues climate change report undermining its own 
policy, VOX (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/26/18112505/national-
climate-assessment-2018-trump. 
















* * * 
COVID-19 has changed us and killed us, but it has also presented an 
opportunity: it has allowed us to observe our governance responses at work. 
We can use these observations to ensure that when the next crisis comes—
and it will—we are able to respond in a way that accounts for and works with 
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